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As a consequence of the secrecy surrounding South African oil exploration during the 
apartheid era, and the highly specialised nature of the industry, the specifics of the 
special OP26 rules were largely unknown to the revenue authorities and tax 
practitioners, other than those closely involved in the industry (Clegg & Steenkamp, 
2007: 1). 
  
This dissertation provides a clear exposition of difficult legal tracts of the Income Tax 
Act, OP26 prospecting leases, OP26 mining leases and OP26 prospecting sub-lease 
agreements and the Tenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. A study of the 
interpretational rules applicable to fiscal legislation and the surrounding literature, 
analysis and interpretation of the commentary, case law, tracts of the legislation and 
OP26 lease agreements  provide a clear understanding of the historical and current 
corporate taxation of the exploration for and production of oil and gas in South 
Africa. 
 
The dissertation evaluates whether the Tenth Schedule achieves the aim of greater 
transparency and standardization and tests the hypothesis that companies engaged in 
the exploration and production of oil and gas enjoy the same, if not more favourable, 
tax dispensation under the Tenth Schedule than under the OP26 regime. 
 
Following the introductory chapter, the remainder of the dissertation is set out below. 
Chapter 2 explains the OP26  and the Tenth Schedule regimes. The chapter further 
considers transparency and standardisation in relation to the OP26 regime compared 
with the Tenth Schedule regime. The dissertation tests the purpose of transparency 
and standardisation against anti-avoidance and consistent interpretation. Chapter 2 
concludes that the Tenth Schedule does not in all circumstances afford greater 
transparency and standardisation particularly in relation to fiscal stability agreements. 
Chapter 3 provides the comparison of the original OP26 prospecting lease, OP26 
mining lease and OP26 prospecting sub-lease agreements and the tax treatment under 















treatment under the Tenth  Schedule to identify their similarities. The conclusion 
drawn is that the Tenth Schedule offers tax benefits to oil and gas companies that are 
comparable to the OP26 regime.   Chapter 4 examines the primary concerns of 
existing investors in the upstream oil and gas sector in relation to the taxation of the 
exploration for and production of oil and gas in South Africa. The interpretational 
issues are discussed and possible amendments to the Tenth Schedule that may be 
required are identified. The finding is that not all of the core aspects of the OP26 
regime have been fully preserved by the Tenth Schedule, specifically Fiscal Stability.   
 
The dissertation concludes in chapter 5 with a summary of the findings from the 
preceding chapters, postulates the interventions and corrective action that the revenue 
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CFC Controlled foreign corporation 
CGT Capital gains tax 
CIPRO  The Company and Intellectual Property Registrar’s Office of South 
Africa 
DTA Double Taxation Agreement 
GAAR General anti-avoidance rule 
ITA  The Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 as amended  
JOA  Joint Operating Agreement 
JV  Joint venture partnership 
MPRDA The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, No 28 of 
2002 




OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OP26  A prospecting lease (or sublease) issued in terms of section 14(1)(b) of 
the Mining Rights Act, 1967 (no. OP26) 
OPASA The Offshore Petroleum Association of South Africa 
POEM Place of effective management  
PSLA OP26 Prospecting Sub-Lease Agreement 
RLA Act Revenue Laws Amendment Act, No 20 of 2006 
SARS  The South African Revenue Service 
STC  Secondary tax on companies 
VAT  Value added tax 



















Act    The Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 as amended 
Commissioner   The Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service  
Dry hole An exploratory or development well found to be 
incapable of producing either oil or gas in sufficient 
quantities to justify completion as an oil or gas well. 
Explanatory Memorandum Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws  
Amendment Bill, 2006  
Gas Any subsoil combustible gas, consisting primarily of 
hydrocarbons, other than hydrocarbons converted from 
bituminous shales or other stratified deposits of solid 
hydrocarbons (such as coal) 
Hydrocarbons An organic compound consisting entirely of hydrogen 
and carbon 
Mining block A lease or a number of leases of adjoining tracts of land 
that constitute a unit of acreage sufficient to justify the 
expense of drilling an exploration or development well. 
Mining Rights Act The Mining Rights Act, No 20 of 1967 
Minister The Minister of Minerals and Energy Affairs 
National Treasury The National Treasury’s legislative mandate is described 
in the Public Finance Management Act (Chapter 2). The 
National Treasury is mandated to promote government’s 
fiscal policy framework; to coordinate macroeconomic 
policy and intergovernmental financial relations; to 
manage the budget preparation process; to facilitate the 
Division of Revenue Act, which provides for an 
equitable distribution of nationally raised revenue 
between national, provincial and local government; and 















Offshore The sea-bed and soil within the territorial waters and on 
the continental shelf of the Republic of South Africa 
Oil Any subsoil combustible liquid consisting primarily of 
hydrocarbons, other than hydrocarbons converted from 
bituminous shales or other stratified deposits of solid 
hydrocarbons (such as coal). 
OP26 regime The original OP26 prospecting lease, OP26 mining lease 
and OP26 prospecting sub-lease agreements, and the tax 
treatment under these lease agreements 
SOEKOR Suidelike Olie-Eksplorasie Korporasie (Eiendoms) 
Beperk. 


























The hydrocarbon minerals industry (such as oil, gas and coal) has a number of special 
features which make it quite distinct from most other industries and other forms of 
economic activity. These differences relate to: size of investment, timescale, location, 
risk, cost of failure, size of reward, share of gross domestic product, level of 
employment, role of international markets and the non-renewable nature of 
hydrocarbon mineral resources. 
 
Because of the distinctive features of the hydrocarbon mineral extraction industry a 
government is likely to formulate a specific tax policy (Andrews-Speed, 2000:1.5). 
Correspondingly, the taxation of revenues from crude oil and natural gas reserves in 
South Africa has been subject to rules that are significantly different from those 
applicable to other operations (including other resource operations such as mining). 
South Africa’s investment regime for oil and gas exploration and production (prior to 
years of assessment commencing on or after 2 November 2006) was governed by the 
OP26 prospecting lease, OP26 mining lease and OP26 mining subleases, collectively 
known as “OP26”.  OP26 contained tax incentives that overrode the Income Tax Act, 
No 58 of 1962 (the “ITA” or the “Act”), including a tax stabilisation regime that 
“froze” the provisions of the Income Tax as at 1977 (Mitchell, 2007:228). 
 
Clegg & Steenkamp (2007: 1) indicate that the reason for the special treatment of oil 
and gas exploration and production (in South Africa) is rather obvious. First of all, the 
discovery and production of oil and gas within a specific country’s territory is usually 
of great strategic significance, since it may lead to the generation of substantial 
foreign revenue for the country, and also decrease the dependency of a country on 
external sources to satisfy its energy needs. Since the exploration for oil and gas is an 
extremely costly and a medium to long term exercise, governments have identified the 
need to make it attractive for local and global companies to invest in oil and gas 
















The most popular method to do this has consistently been to reward such companies 
with a beneficial tax regime. Countries with less favourable geological conditions 
normally offer better fiscal terms, while those perceived to have more potential offer 
tougher terms. Investment in hydrocarbon exploration will only occur if a 
combination of the fiscal terms, geological reality and the oil (or gas or mineral) price 
make it worthwhile to invest (Omar, 1998: 2). 
  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2006
1
 states 
that despite being rich in many hard minerals, South Africa has not shared the same 
success in oil and gas reserves. Exploration over the past thirty years has revealed 
only small deposits offshore in the South and in the West. A few companies do, 
however, remain interested in the region, especially given recent oil prices. 
 
In 2002, the new Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002 
was promulgated. This Act proposes a departure from the existing oil and gas 
prospecting and mineral rights as contained in OP26.
2
 OP26 leases that were in 
existence prior to the promulgation of this Act were to continue in force until 
terminated or expired or until June 2007, whichever occurred first. 
 
In order to fill the vacuum created by the demise of the OP26, the National Treasury 
has negotiated and finalised a new tax regime, partially based on that of OP26. This 
new tax regime is known as the “Tenth Schedule regime”.  Mitchell (2007: 228) notes 
that given the high risks and historically low rewards (in South Africa), if the key 
features of the OP26 regime were not renewed, few of the active companies would 
remain invested. 
 
In addition to filling the void created by the demise of OP26, the Tenth Schedule to 
the Income Tax Act should ensure greater transparency and standardization of the 
beneficial tax incentives applicable to the upstream oil and gas industry (in South 
Africa) (Clegg and Steenkamp, 2007: 2).  
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 At 15. 
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1.2 Research Hypothesis 
 
This dissertation evaluates whether or not: (a) the Tenth Schedule achieves the aim of 
greater transparency and standardization and (b) tests the hypothesis that companies 
engaged in the exploration and production of oil and gas enjoy the same, if not more 
favourable, tax dispensation under the Tenth Schedule than under the OP26 regime. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
The research is qualitative in nature and follows the process of identifying, analysing, 
organising and synthesising statutes, judicial decisions and commentary, typical of 
doctorial research (McKerchar, 2008:18).  
 
In this dissertation analysis is achieved through examination of the legal tracts of the 
Income Tax Act, OP26 prospecting leases, OP26 mining leases and OP26 prospecting 
sub-lease agreements (collectively known as “OP26”) and the Tenth Schedule of the 
Income Tax Act and the application of the interpretational rules applicable to fiscal 
legislation to identify the interpretational difficulties and the practical shortcomings of 
the OP26 and Tenth Schedule regimes. Furthermore the OP26 and Tenth Schedule 
regimes are compared to evaluate the impact of their similarities and differences on 
existing Oil and Gas Companies decisions to remain invested in South Africa. The 
dissertation also provides analysis and interpretation of the literature, commentary and 
case law to provide a clear understanding of the historical and current corporate 
taxation of the exploration for and production of oil and gas in South Africa for the 
benefit of possible new investors. 
 
1.4 Scope of the Dissertation 
 
The scope of this dissertation is confined to the corporate income tax implications of 
the exploration for and production of oil and gas under a prospecting or mining lease 
to be converted from OP26, or granted under the MPRDA (namely South African oil 















implications of offshore exploration for and production of oil and gas as conducted 
within South Africa’s territorial waters and on the continental shelf. The dissertation 
does not address the taxation of midstream and downstream oil and gas activities 
(such as refining and marketing, distribution and sales of petroleum products). 
 
The dissertation is further limited to legal entities such a South African incorporated 
company (namely a South African tax resident) or the branch of a foreign company 
registered with CIPRO in South Africa (namely a non-resident for tax purposes) 
carrying out exploration for and production of oil and gas. The dissertation examines 
the South African corporate income taxation of such companies and branches. Other 
taxes, such as employees’ tax and state royalties that are administrated by the 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, are not dealt within the ambit 
of the dissertation. International tax considerations in relation to corporate income 
taxation; such as place of effective management (“POEM”), Transfer Pricing, Thin 
Capitalisation, Controlled Foreign Corporations (“CFC”) and Double Taxation 
Agreements (“DTAs”) including the definition of Permanent Establishment (“PE”), 
for the purpose of attribution of business profits are only considered where such 
aspects inform the South African tax considerations. 
 
Finally the dissertation considers only those items of revenue and expenditure that are 
directly associated with the prospecting for and mining of oil and gas as dealt with in 
the OP26 regime and the Tenth Schedule. This examination of revenue and 
expenditure is limited to the corporate income taxation of these items in relation to the 
tax year of assessment ending in 2010/11. 
 
1.5 Dissertation structure 
 
Following the introductory chapter, the remainder of the dissertation is as set out 
below. Chapter 2 explains the OP26 and the Tenth Schedule regimes. The chapter 
further considers transparency and standardisation in relation to the OP26 regime 
compared with the Tenth Schedule regime. The dissertation tests the purpose of 
transparency and standardisation in relation to anti-avoidance and consistent 















circumstances afford greater transparency and standardisation particularly in relation 
to fiscal stability agreements.  
 
Chapter 3 provides the comparison of the original OP26 prospecting lease, OP26 
mining lease and OP26 prospecting sub-lease agreements and the tax treatment under 
these lease agreements (referred to generically as the OP26 regime), to the tax 
treatment under the Tenth  Schedule to identify their similarities. The conclusion 
drawn is that the Tenth Schedule offers tax benefits to oil and gas companies that are 
comparable to the OP26 regime. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the primary concerns of existing investors in the upstream oil and 
gas sector in relation to the taxation of the exploration for and production of oil and 
gas in South Africa. The interpretational issues are discussed and possible 
amendments to the Tenth Schedule that may be required are identified. The finding is 
that not all of the core aspects of the OP26 regime have been fully preserved by the 
Tenth Schedule, specifically Fiscal Stability.   
 
Chapter 5 summarises the findings from the preceding chapters, postulates the 
interventions and corrective action that the revenue authorities may take and makes 




















Research conducted in Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Malawi, DRC and 
South Africa shows that African governments are foregoing millions of dollars in tax 
revenue from the mining industry. This is largely because of overly generous tax 
concessions, usually granted discretionarily in secret mining contracts, as well as tax 
avoidance and illegal tax evasion practices by multinational mining companies. These 
losses are fuelled by a lack of transparency (Lambrechts et al., 2009:14).  
 
Lambrechts et al. (2009:14) argues that transparent and balanced mining tax regimes, 
as opposed to secret tax deals with individual companies, are the best way to avoid 
corruption and assure citizens and investors that the rents from mining are being 
shared fairly. 
 
Manuel (2006: 1) states that South Africa has a long history of tax incentives to attract 
oil and gas exploration/extraction via private leasing agreements. These incentives 
(known as OP 26 agreements) have assisted in attracting oil and gas investment to the 
South African west and southern coast lines. The Tenth Schedule developed in the 
wake of the expiry of these agreements renews and modernises key features of the OP 
26 regime in a more transparent and user-friendly form (Manuel, 2006:1). 
 
In this chapter the author evaluates whether the Tenth Schedule results in greater 
transparency and standardization. 
 
2.2 Understanding the OP26 regime 
 
SOEKOR (Pty) Limited (the state owned “Exploration and Production Company”) 
was granted, in 1967, the right in terms of Prospecting Lease OP26 (“OP26 

















 and on the continental shelf 
4
of the Republic of South Africa, 
and, if a commercially viable discovery was made, to enter into a mining lease. 
 
The OP26 prospecting lease grants SOEKOR the right to sub-let portions of the 
prospecting area (clause 15.1) and to enter into joint ventures (“JV”), partnerships and 
other forms of co-operation agreements in any portion of the prospecting area (clause 
15.2), on such terms and conditions as the Minister of Minerals and Energy Affairs 
(“the Minister”) may approve. The OP26 prospecting lease provides that any sub-
lease, JV arrangement, etc. will be subject to the same tax dispensation in relation to 
prospecting operations (clause 33) as well as in relation to any OP26 mining lease 
granted pursuant thereto (clause 23). 
 
Transactions in connection with the OP26 prospecting lease and the OP26 prospecting 
sub-leases are taxed, based on the Income Tax Act as at 1977 (clause 33). 
Transactions in terms of the OP26 mining leases are taxable in accordance with the 
current provisions of Income Tax Act, subject to the following:  
 in respect of deductions, the provisions of the Income Tax Act as at 1977 shall 
apply if they are more favourable than those of the current provisions; and 
 certain other special tax consequences are also prescribed by the OP26 mining 
lease (clause 23). 
 
The Prospecting Lease OP29 (“OP29 prospecting lease”), was also granted to 
SOEKOR in 1967. In terms of the OP29 prospecting lease, SOEKOR was granted the 
right to prospect for and develop commercially viable onshore discoveries. The OP29 
prospecting lease was relinquished by SOEKOR in 1992. As a result, the taxation of 
income from onshore exploration and production is taxed in accordance with the 





                                                 
3
 “Territorial waters” means the territorial waters as defined in section 2 of the Territorial Waters Act, 
1963 (Act No 87 of 1963). 
4
 “Continental shelf” means the continental shelf referred to in section 7 of the Territorial Waters Act, 















2.3 Understanding the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
The Tenth Schedule regime came into operation on 2 November 2006 and applies to 
tax years of assessment commencing on or after 2 November 2006. Under the Tenth 
Schedule regime the taxation of oil and gas companies is no longer governed by the 
terms of the oil and gas right, but rather an oil and gas company is taxed in 





2.4.1 Lack of Transparency under the OP26 regime 
 
It was only the OP26 lease holders (“OP26 taxpayers”), their tax advisors, their SARS 
assessor and the Department of Minerals and Energy who had intimate knowledge of 
the OP26 regime. The OP26 lease agreements are still not publically available or 
published by the Department of Minerals and Energy. Accordingly, it may be said 
that the OP26 regime lacks transparency. 
 
2.4.2 Transparency under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
The Tenth Schedule is a schedule to the body of the Income Tax Act and as such is 
part of the formal legislative framework. Its provisions were enacted by parliament 
(namely statute), gazetted in the Government Gazette and published by the 
government printers as part and parcel of the Income Tax Act. It can therefore be said 
that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule are available to the public and are publicly 
known amongst taxpayers, tax practitioners and the revenue authorities (National 
Treasury and the SARS). 
 
This transparency however does not extend to the fiscal stability agreements 

















 (refer to 2.5.2 below). To date
6
 the Minister of Finance has signed two 
fiscal stability agreements. Although there is a standard form of the Memorandum of 
Agreement (“MOA”) proposed by National Treasury,
7
 the terms and wording of the 




 differ from each other. 
Furthermore, these agreements are not publicized and therefore it is only the specific 
taxpayers concerned, National Treasury (who facilitated the signing of the MOA), the 
Minister of Finance and the taxpayer’s SARS assessor that are privy to the content of 
these fiscal stability agreements.  
 
2.4.3 Purpose of Transparency 
 
The purpose of transparency is to ensure the successful administration of tax anti-
avoidance by the revenue authorities.  
 
Huxham & Haupt (2010:450) indicate that it is crucial to distinguish between “tax 
avoidance” and “tax evasion”. Tax evasion, an illegal offence resulting in severe 
penalties and possible imprisonment, involves the usage of fraud or deceit to reduce a 
tax liability through the non-disclosure of income and overstating deductions. 
Conversely, tax avoidance is the manner whereby a taxpayer would legitimately 
organise his affairs in such way that would result in the minimum tax liability 
imposed by the Income Tax Act. 
 
Taxpayers, as often cited, are entitled to arrange their affairs in such manner with the 
result that the tax payable is less than it otherwise would have been, provided there is 
no provision in the law designed to prevent or counter the avoidance of tax by means 




                                                 
5
 Paragraph 8 of the Tenth Schedule. 
6
 As at 13 October 2008, being the date of the last MOA signed by the Minister of Finance. 
7
 See Annexure B of this dissertation 
8
 Forest Exploration International (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd 
9
 BHP Billiton Petroleum Great Britain Limited 
10
 Lord Tomlin stated (at 520) in IRC v Duke of Westminster, 1936, 19 TC 490: 
“Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts 
is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, 
however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow-taxpayers may be of his 
















Under the OP26 regime, tax anti-avoidance was enforced by means of a “General 
Anti-Avoidance Rule” (“GAAR”) as contained in section 103 of the Income Tax Act.  
According to Louw (2007:10) the GAAR provided that the Commissioner could only 




(a) A transaction, operation, or scheme had to exist; 
(b) which resulted in the avoidance, reduction or postponement of a tax liability 
levied in terms of the Income Tax Act; 
(c) the “abnormality requirement” must be present having regard to the 
transaction, operation, or scheme, either, in relation to a manner not normally 
employed for bona fide business purposes other than obtaining a tax benefit, 
or the transaction, operation, or scheme created abnormal rights and 
obligations; and 
(d) the transaction, operation, or scheme must have been entered into solely or 
mainly to obtain a “tax benefit”. 
 
Such tax benefit would incorporate “any avoidance, postponement or reduction of 
liability for payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by the Income Tax Act or by 
any other law administered by the Commissioner”.
12
 Once established, the onus rests 
with the taxpayer
13
 to prove that the sole or main purpose of the transaction was other 
than to avoid tax. 
 
Section 103 of the Income Tax Act was replaced by section 80A to 80L of the Income 
Tax Act in 2006. In terms of section 26B(3) the general anti-avoidance rules apply to 
the Tenth Schedule. The general anti-avoidance rules applicable to the Tenth 





Clegg, 2010 at 23.6 indicates that in accordance with sections 80A to 80L of the 
Income Tax Act, the GAAR (as applicable to the Tenth Schedule) requires the 
                                                 
11
 SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A) (33 SATC 113) 
12
 Section 103(7) of the ITA 
13
 Section 82 of the ITA and ITC 1636 (60 SATC 267) 
14
 Part IIA come into effect for tax “avoidance” arrangements entered into on or after 2 November 2006 















following three elements to be present before it can be applied successfully. Firstly, 
an “avoidance arrangement” must be present. Secondly, the sole or main purpose of 
such avoidance arrangement must have been to obtain a “tax benefit”. And finally, in 
addition to obtaining a tax benefit, one of the tainted elements must be present, which 
are – the “abnormality” element, or, “lack of commercial substance” element, or, 
“misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act” element (Louw, 2007:19). 
 
The three elements of the new GAAR are largely reminiscent of the old GAAR under 
section 103(1), however the “lack of commercial substance” tainted element and 
“misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act” tainted element are “new” 
requirements.    
 
An avoidance arrangement is presumed to lack commercial substance if it would 
result in a significant tax benefit for a taxpayer but has no significant effect upon 
either business risks or net cash flows of that taxpayer (aside from the purported tax 
effects). The application of this presumptive test is problematic since there is no 
indication of what would constitute a “significant” tax benefit. Presumably the benefit 
must be significant in the context of the particular taxpayer’s financial affairs in 
general. The same difficulty applies to determining whether there is a “significant 




Van Schalkwyk & Geldenhuys (2009: 168) indicate that the concept of a “misuse or 
abuse” is new to the South African income tax environment. According to the Revised 
Proposals on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the Income Tax Act, the rationale 
behind the insertion of the “misuse or abuse” element was to reinforce the modern 
approach to the interpretation of tax statutes “in order to find the meaning that 
harmonizes the wording, object, spirit and purpose of the provisions of the Income 
Tax Act” (SARS 2006:16). The quoted part of the rationale was borrowed from the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v 
Canada 2005 SCC 54 (at paragraph 54).  
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Canada Trustco Mortgage Company (supra) is regarded as the leading case relating to 
the Canadian GAAR as contained in section 245 of the Canadian Federal Income Tax 
Act (Meyerowitz et al., 2007:147). According to Olivier & Honiball (2008: 405), the 
meaning of the words “misuse or abuse” in Canadian case law are exactly what was 
intended by the South African Legislature with the phrase “a misuse or abuse of the 
provisions”. 
 
In Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that 
the words “misuse or abuse” imply “frustrating” or “defeating” the purpose of the 
provisions relied on by the taxpayer. It is submitted that a “misuse or abuse of the 
provisions” implies violating the purpose of a provision. 
 
In the absence of transparency, it would be difficult for SARS to determine whether 
or not there has been “misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act” when it is unclear 
which version of the Income Tax Act to apply, namely the Income Tax Act as at a 
specified date in relation to the OP26 leases or a fiscal stability agreement concluded 
in terms of the Tenth Schedule. Furthermore in the absence of transparency, it would 
be difficult to ascertain whether the “abnormality” element is present, when the terms 
of the OP26 lease or fiscal stability agreement are unknown to the assessor. To 
conclude, the OP26 regime lacked transparency because it was not available in the 
public domain. The Tenth Schedule regime is an improvement but lacks “sufficient” 
transparency. This lack of transparency creates the opportunity for tax avoidance to 




2.5.1 Lack of Standardization under the OP26 regime 
 
Even though there was a standard form
16
 for the OP26 prospecting lease and OP26 
mining lease, each OP26 lease is unique. There are subtle differences between the tax 
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 The standard form of the mining lease is included as Addendum A to the OP26 prospecting lease. 
Clause 23 of the OP26 prospecting lease: 
 “The terms and conditions of any Mining Lease to which SOEKOR shall become entitled […] 
shall be prescribed in Addendum “A” hereto, which forms an integral part of this Prospecting 















treatment under the original OP26 lease and the sub-leases by virtue of inconsistent 
terminology used
17
 as between leases entered into at different points in time (Clegg, 
2006:6). These differences relate primarily to special incentives with regard to water 
depth, a discretionary power given to the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs (in 
consultation with the Minister of Finance) to reduce the tax charge and the tax rate for 
oil and gas mining companies under the OP26 regime.  
 
Furthermore, the version of the Income Tax Act to be applied in the computation of 
taxable income under the OP26 regime also differed from OP26 leaseholder to 
leaseholder based on the type of OP26 lease held and the discretionary elections 
available to certain lease holders. The OP26 prospecting lease holders and OP26 
prospecting sub-lease holders are taxed in terms of the provisions of the Income Tax 
Act as at 1977. OP26 mining leaseholders are taxed in terms of the current Income 
Tax Act and could elect to claim a favourable tax deduction under the Income Tax 
Act as at 1977. Accordingly, it may be said that the tax treatment under the OP26 
regime lacked standardisation. 
 
Refer to Annexure A, Table 1, the prominent differences between the OP26 lease 
agreements.   
2.5.2 Standardization under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
Whilst the provisions of the Tenth Schedule are transparent (in that they are publically 
available and published as part of the Income Tax Act), the Tenth Schedule does not 
fully standardize the corporate income taxation of oil and gas companies because of 
the ability to freeze provisions under a fiscal stability agreement.  
 
                                                 
17
 For example the original OP26 mining lease provides that “SOEKOR shall throughout the terms of 
this Mining Lease be liable for income tax payments to the State on the annual taxable income derived 
by it from the mining of natural oil […]”, whereas the OP26 mining sub-leases refer to the Lessee 
being “liable for income tax payments to the State on annual taxable income derived by it from mining 
for natural oil”. The difference in emphasis raises the issue whether there should be a different 
interpretative result (in the case for instance of a “farm out” where the proceeds may be said to result 
from the mining for natural oil, but not from the mining of natural oil which would seem to imply a 
















In recognition of the need for oil and gas companies to have certainty as to the tax 
treatment of future revenues and in conformity with international practice, the 
Minister of Finance may enter into a fiscal stabilization contract with an oil and gas 
company. Such a contract binds the state and guarantees that the provisions of the 
Tenth Schedule at the date that a particular oil and gas right is acquired, apply and 
that the contract may not be amended for the duration of the oil and gas company’s 
right (or any renewals thereof and conversions from the time of exploration to the 




The fiscal stability agreement will remain in place over the full life of the oil and gas 




An oil and gas company may at any time, unilaterally rescind the agreements if so 





The ability to “freeze” the taxation of an oil and gas company through use of a fiscal 
stability agreement creates the situation that the tax treatment will differ by virtue of 
changes in the provisions of the Tenth Schedule between fiscal stability agreements 
entered into at different points in time for each oil and gas right. There were as many 
as four fiscal amendment Acts
21
 in South Africa per annum. The impact is that the 
revenue authorities will still need to be cognisant of the terms of the Tenth Schedule 
as at a specified date in relation to each oil and gas right in respect which a taxpayer 
has obtained a fiscal stability agreement. On a practical level this may require separate 
tax calculations per oil and gas right that will be consolidated to provide the final 
taxable income of an oil and gas company. Accordingly, it may be said that the tax 
treatment under the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act lacks standardisation. 
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 Paragraph 8(1) of the Tenth Schedule 
19
 Paragraph 8(2) of the Tenth Schedule 
20
 Paragraph 8(3) of the Tenth Schedule. 
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2.5.3 Purpose of standardization 
 
The purpose of standardization is twofold. Standardization makes the administration 
of tax compliance easier for the taxpayer (and the SARS). Standardization also allows 
for consistent interpretation and therefore application of the provisions of the tax 
legislation. 
 
The OP26 regime is contract based. Accordingly, the general principles for the 
interpretation of contracts are applied. These principles are summarised as follows in 
Coopers v Lybrand & Bryant 1995(3) SA761(A) at 767E-768E: 
 
“According to the ‘golden rule’ of interpretation the language in the document is to 
be given it’s grammatical and ordinary meaning, unless this would result in some 
absurdity or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument […] 
The mode of construction should never be to interpret the particular word or phrase 
in isolation (in vacuo) by itself […] The correct ap roach to the application of the 
‘golden rule’ of interpretation after having ascertained the literal meaning of the 
word or phrase in question is, broadly speaking, to have regard: 
(1) To the context in which the word or phrase is used within its inter relation to 
the contract as a whole, including the nature and purpose of the contract […]; 
(2) To the background circumstances which explain the genesis and purpose of 
the contract, i.e. to matters probably present to the minds of the parties when 
they contracted […]; 
(3) To apply extrinsic evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances when 
the language of the document is on the face of it ambiguous, by considering 
previous negotiations and correspondence between the parties, subsequent 
conduct of the parties showing the sense in which they acted on the document, 
















The Tenth Schedule is regimented within the legal framework of the Income Tax Act. 
The interpretation of the Tenth Schedule therefore follows the principles of 




Van Schalkwyk & Geldenhuys (2009:169) indicate that in common law tradition, 
there are two broad approaches to the interpretation of statutes (which includes tax 
statutes),
23
 namely the traditional and the modern approach. Each of these approaches 
consists of two general theories to interpretation, that is, literalism and intentionalism 
in the case of the traditional approach, and purposivism and contextualism in the case 
of the modern approach (Du Plessis 2002:93-98). These theories are not mutually 
exclusive, because in many instances their application is intertwined. According to 
literalism, the true meaning of a statutory provision is to be sought virtually 
exclusively in the very words used by the Legislature (Devenish 1992:26).
24
 The 
words of the provision must be adhered to, regardless of manifestly unjust or even 
absurd consequences (Joubert & Faris 2001:282). Intentionalism (also referred to as 
the subjective theory) holds that the meaning of a statutory provision is governed by 
what the Legislature intended as disclosed by the wording of the provision (Kellaway 
1995:63). This implies that the real intention of the Legislature, once discerned, 
should be given effect to (Du Plessis 2002:94). Purposivism attributes meaning to a 
                                                 
22
 Van Schalkwyk & Geldenhuys (2009:19) state that with regard to constitutional and statutory 
interpretation, section 39(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states the 
following: 
“39. Interpretation of Bill of Rights. 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.” 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution gives specific instructions on how to interpret the Bill of Rights. 
Section 39(2) deals with the interpretation of any other legislation. These sections command a similar 
interpretative approach to both the Constitution and statutes. Thus, in effect, constitutional 
interpretation determines and shapes statutory interpretation (Du Plessis 2002:133). 
23
 Botha JA in Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 (A) at page 727: “there 
seems little reason why the interpretation of fiscal legislation should be subjected to special treatment 
which is not applicable in the interpretation of other legislation” 
24
 The spirit of the law cannot operate beyond the limits of its language. This principle was laid down 
by Innes CJ in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at page 544. It implies that a 
court cannot do violence to the language of the lawgiver by placing upon it a meaning of which it is not 
reasonably capable, in order to give effect to what he or she may think to be the policy or object of the 















statutory provision in the light of the purpose it seeks to achieve
25
 (Joubert & Faris 
2001:285). Legislative purpose is a more general and far more an objective concept 
than that of legislative intent (Devenish 1992:35). Contextualism is often advanced as 
the interpretive twin of purposivism, the argument being that the purpose of a 
provision can only be ascertained by looking at it in context 
26
(Du Plessis 2002:97). 
The meaning of a provision is often said to be determinable by reading its words in 
context or reading the language in context or reading the provision itself in context 
(Joubert & Faris 2001:297). 
 
The two broad approaches to the interpretation of statutes, in common law tradition, 





The principles for interpretation in relation to contracts and statutes have the 
following in common: 
1) Emphasis on the words used; and 
2) The use of the words in a particular context. 
Therefore, where standardisation provides for use of consistent terminology within 
the framework of the Tenth Schedule, standardisation should ensure that the Tenth 
Schedule regime is interpreted on a similar basis by oil and gas companies and SARS.  
 
                                                 
25
 The “context” of a statute refers not only to the language of the rest of the statute, but also to the 
“matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its background”. This 
principle was laid down by Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. 
and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at page 662 
26
 In De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v CSARS (2002) 3 All SA 181 (A), Nienaber JA emphasised the 
cardinal importance of the context in which the words or phrases are used when interpreting tax 
statutes. He stated, at paragraph 7, that the language of a provision must “take its colour, like a 
chameleon, from its setting and surrounds in the Act”. 
27















Under the OP26 regime the terminology used in the lease agreements would differ 
from the terminology used in the Income Tax Act as at 1977. Accordingly there are 
likely to be differences in interpretation.   
 
 2.6 Conclusion 
 
The aim of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act is to incorporate the taxation of 
oil and gas companies into a formal legislative framework ensuring greater 




 that the insertion of the taxation of companies engaged in the 
exploration for and production of oil and gas into the legislative framework (via 
section 26B and the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act) provides for greater 
transparency, in that the tax treatment is not hidden in a myriad of OP26 prospecting 
leases, OP26 mining leases, OP26 sub-leases, the Income Tax Act as at 1977 and the 
current Income Tax Act. The author furthermore submits that, in the absence of the oil 
and gas company concluding a fiscal stability agreement, the Tenth Schedule also 
provides for greater standardization, given that the oil and gas company is taxed under 




However where the oil and gas company has concluded a fiscal stability agreement 
with the Minister of Finance, both transparency and standardization will be 
compromised. Accordingly, the Tenth Schedule regime under such circumstances 
fails to achieve its stated aim. 
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 Clegg & Steenkamp (2007: 5) and The Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment 
Bill, 2006 supports this submission. 
29
 Section 26B(1) of the ITA provides that the taxable income of any oil and gas company will be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, subject to the specific provisions 

















CHAPTER 3 – SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE OP26 REGIME AND THE 




The fiscal terms accepted by a country reflect the negotiating strength and experience 
of the country, geological prospects, and the track record of previous projects. A 
country with large proven reserves and low exploration and development costs will be 
able to negotiate a higher revenue share than a country that has a short, and perhaps 
somewhat uneven, track record, particularly if there is uncertainty regarding the size, 
quality and extraction costs of its petroleum reserves.  
 
 South Africa has low prospects for oil and gas reserves.  This has prompted tax rules 
that are largely different from those applicable to other operations (including other 
hydrocarbon mining operations such as coal) for companies engaged in the 
exploration for and production of oil and gas.
 
Mitchell (2007: 228) notes that given the high risks and historically low rewards (in 
South Africa), if the key features of the OP26 regime were not renewed, few of the 
active companies would remain invested. According to the Explanatory Memorandum 
(2006:16) the government intended that core aspects of the OP26 regime should be 
renewed under the Tenth Schedule, whilst the lesser aspects would fall away. 
 
This Chapter tests the hypothesis that companies engaged in the exploration and 
production of oil and gas enjoy the same, if not more favourable, tax benefits under 





















3.2 Tax rates 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
Omar (1998:2) states that the income tax rate is one of the most important factors 
determining investment in hydrocarbon production and should be appropriately set to 
attract the necessary foreign investment. According to Omar (1998:2) South Africa is 
faced with relatively unfavourable geological realities and enormous international 
competition with regard to investment in petroleum exploration. The major 
shortcoming of the South African fiscal policy on hydrocarbon production is the fact 
that it is insensitive to changes in the oil price and the geological realities in the 
country.  The legislator has preserved the tax rates under the OP26 regime in the 
Tenth Schedule regime for OP26 leaseholders, based on the assumption that, given 
South Africa’s geology, these rates proved attractive to investors under the OP26 
regime and such investors would remain invested under the Tenth Schedule by 
maintaining the tax rate at 28%. 
 
Garnaut & Ross (1983:18) indicate that where there is a concentration of income from 
mineral production in large, often foreign, corporations are involved in equity for high 
taxation. Although South Africa taxes foreign companies at a higher tax rate under the 
Tenth Schedule regime, the Legislature has not followed the policy proposed by 
Garnaut & Ross by imposing low tax rates. It is South Africa’s fiscal policy to tax 
foreign (non-resident) and local companies on an equitable basis. The difference 
between the tax rate applied to foreign companies and local companies is in 
recognition that local companies pay STC on dividends declared to their shareholders. 
The effective tax rate for a local company is accordingly under the Tenth Schedule 
regime comparable to higher rate paid by foreign companies of 31%. 
 
It is often argued that the oil industry requires higher than average rates of return on 
capital because of its inherent risk (Rutledge & Wright, 1998:803). But, the tax rates 
under the Tenth Schedule and OP26 regime are capped at the current corporate rate of 
tax, namely 28% as applicable to all companies in South Africa. Therefore, it may be 
concluded that the tax rates levied on oil and gas companies in South Africa are not 















3.2.2 Tax rates under OP26 regime 
 
The current income tax rate is applicable to oil and gas companies irrespective of 
whether a particular company is engaged in prospecting for and/or mining of oil and 
gas (clause 23.1, read together with clause 23.4.4), namely 28%, but this rate is 
capped at a specified maximum rate of tax in relation to the OP26 prospecting lease 
and the OP26 prospecting sub-lease holders.
30
 
3.2.3 Tax rates under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
The Tenth Schedule caps the corporate rate at 28% for residents and at 31% for 
foreign companies
31
 that trade in South Africa through a branch.
32
 
                                                 
30
 Clauses 23.1 and 23.2 of OP26 sub-lease agreements provide that SOEKOR was liable for income 
tax payments on the disposal of crude oil and gas at a rate equal to the lesser of that prescribed in the 
Income Tax Act , or: 
(a) 38% of taxable income if disposed crude oil < 2million tons per annum; 
(b) 44% of taxable income if disposed crude oil > 2million tons and <4 million tons per annum; 
(c) 48% of taxable income if disposed crude oil > 4million tons and <10million tons per annum; 
(d) 50% of taxable income if disposed crude oil > 10million tons; and 
(e) 40% of taxable income in respect of gas disposed. 
 
However, certain limitations were also placed on the above provisions. If the tax calculated in terms of 
these provisions were less than 3.5% of the gross income derived by SOEKOR from the disposal of 
crude oil and gas during the year of assessment, tax payable could be increased to: 
(a) 3.5% of gross income; or 
(b) 50% of taxable income whichever was the lesser. 
 
The 1977 Amendment to the Income Tax Act introduced an additional normal tax over and above the 
normal tax rate. The amendment provided for the payment of tax at the same rate as applicable to 
ordinary companies (normal tax) plus an additional normal tax, equal to 40% of taxable income after 
the payment of the said normal tax. In 1977, the original conditions of OP26 were still in place, and in 
terms of clause 23.3 of this lease, the amendments to the Income Tax Act would only have been 
applicable to SOEKOR in so far as it did not prejudice SOEKOR’s rights in terms of the OP26. 
 
OP26 was amended in 1981 to include the provision of normal and additional normal tax and 
determined that tax payable is limited to the minimum of the amount determined in terms of the 
Income Tax Act, or: 
a) Normal tax plus an additional normal tax calculated at 20% or remaining taxable income 
while cumulative taxable income is less than total direct capital development costs giving an 
effective rate of 48% presently; 
b) Normal tax plus an additional normal tax calculated at 30% of remaining taxable income 
while cumulative taxable income is greater than total direct capital development costs but less 
than twice the total direct capital development costs giving an effective rate of 54.5% 
presently; or 
c) Normal tax plus an additional normal tax calculated at 40% of remaining taxable income 
while cumulative taxable income is greater than two times total direct capital development 
costs giving an effective rate of 61% presently. 
No distinction is made between tax on oil and gas in terms of the amended OP26 of 1981.  
31
 Under this basis of taxation, resident oil and gas companies are subject to tax on their world wide 
income, while non-resident oil and gas companies are subject to tax only on their South African source 
















If a foreign company that carries on trade in South Africa previously derived its 
exploration and production rights from an earlier OP26 lease agreement (which is 
now converted to a MPRDA right), the rate of tax may not exceed 28%. This 
distinction arises from the fiscal stabilisation clause to which OP26 lessees were 





The capping of the corporate income tax rate at 28% under the Tenth Schedule is 
more favourable than the cap for the corporate income tax rate as provided for under 
the OP26 regime (refer to 3.2.2 of this dissertation).  
 
3.3 Secondary Tax on Companies (“STC”) 
 
In 1993 section 64B of the Income Tax Act was inserted in terms of which a 
secondary tax on companies (“STC”) is imposed. STC is currently levied at the rate of 
10% on the net dividends (dividends declared less certain dividends received) 
distributed by a resident company, whether to residents or to foreign companies.  
 
3.3.1 STC under the OP26 regime 
 
The OP26 mining sub-leases specifically exempt the lessee from Secondary Tax on 
Companies (“STC”) (clause 23.4.4 of the Mining Lease
34
), the OP26 prospecting 
lease does not contain an express exemption (the terms being drafted prior to the 
introduction of STC). The OP26 prospecting lease imposes liability for corporate 
                                                                                                                                            
established or formed in the Republic or which has its place of effective management in the Republic”. 
Furthermore, a person defined as a resident of any other country in terms of a Double Taxation 
Agreement with that country is excluded from being a resident of South Africa for Income Tax 
purposes.    
32
 Paragraph 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule 
33
 Paragraph 2(2) of the Tenth Schedule 
34
 Clause 23.4.4 of the OP26 mining lease provides that the “Lessee shall not be liable to the State for 
distributed or undistributed profits tax, including the Secondary Tax on Companies imposed under Part 
















income tax under the Income Tax Act as at 1977, but the relief provided by clause 
33
35
 is arguably too narrow
36
 to preclude a tax in the nature of STC.  
 
Accordingly, where there has been a farm-out or disposal of a participation in an 
OP26 prospecting lease and the taxpayer records an income or capital gain, and 
thereafter declares a dividend to its shareholder, the dividend declaration will attract 
STC.  
 
Arguably in the context of a dividend remittance to a foreign company, there may be 
relief under the OP26 regime from STC on remittances outside the Republic (Arthur 
Anderson, 1993:18). The OP26 mining lease exempts the lessee from, inter alia, “any 
tax on the remittance outside the Republic of South Africa of profits derived from the 
mining of natural oil
37
”. It is submitted that this interpretation is incorrect as STC is 
based on the declaration of a dividend to a foreign company and not the physical 
export of funds (i.e. the remittance of the dividend).   
 
3.3.2 STC under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
In terms of section 26B(2) of the Income Tax Act any tax payable on the net amount 
of any dividend declared by an oil and gas company as derived from profits 
attributable to its oil and gas income (namely STC), must be determined in terms of 
the Income Tax Act, but also subject to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. 
 
                                                 
35
 Clause 33 of the OP26 prospecting lease secured that throughout the period of the prospecting lease’s 
validity it would be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the Republic of South 
Africa, in force from a specified date, namely the promulgation date of the specified Income Tax Act 
amendments (“1977”), and by such further laws as may be passed in addition to or in substitution of 
them, provided such further laws shall not adversely affect the contractual rights and obligations of the 
leasee under the prospecting lease without its consent. 
36
 Whilst at first sight this clause 33 precludes the application of legislation subsequent to 1977, it is 
submitted that this clause is not relevant in respect of tax, which is referred to in clause 28, with the 
result that this clause does not prevent the levying of STC. In terms of clause 28, the OP26 prospecting 
leaseholder is “liable for income tax payments to the state on the annual taxable income derived by it 
from the prospecting for Natural Oil and transactions in connection therewith in accordance with the 
Income Tax Act as of the date the 1977 amendments thereto were promulgated. As STC is not levied 
on “taxable income”, but on distributed profits, the current Income Tax Act arguably applies to a 
dividend declaration during the prospecting phase. 
37















STC is limited to 5% on the net amount of the dividend declared by an oil and gas 
company derived from profits of its oil and gas income. This rate is reduced to 0% in 
the case of dividends declared by an oil and gas company if all its oil and gas rights 
are solely derived by virtue of a previous OP26 right.
38
 The 5% and 0% rates will 




Foreign companies that are subject to the 31% corporate tax rate are exempted from 
STC, as would be the case for any non-resident. 
 
The STC provisions under the Tenth Schedule are similar to those of the OP26 
regime. Particularly in relation to an oil and gas company that held an OP26 mining 
sub-lease agreement (which provides for an exemption from STC) that is now taxed 
under the Tenth Schedule at 0%. 
 
3.3.3 Legislative changes with regard to the taxation of dividends 
 
Clegg (2010: 349) states that the STC is in the process of being replaced by a 
dividend withholding tax (“WHT”). The dividend WHT will no longer be a tax on the 
company declaring the dividends but, rather, on the shareholder. When the dividend 
WHT is introduced it is expected that the specific rate provisions relating to the STC 
will generally apply to the dividend WHT. 
3.4 Capital Gains Tax (“CGT”) 
 
Capital Gains Tax (“CGT”) was introduced from 1 October 2001. As set out in the 
Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, any capital gain made from the disposal of 
any “asset” (which is widely defined and would include the disposal of shares in an 
oil and gas company or mining rights) would be subject to CGT at an effective rate of 
14% for companies. 
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 Paragraph 3(1) and 3(2) of the Tenth Schedule 
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3.4.1 CGT under the OP26 regime 
 
The OP26 prospecting lease states that the OP26 leaseholder is “liable for income tax 
payments to the State on the annual taxable income derived by it from the prospecting 
for natural oil
40
 and transactions in connection therewith in accordance with the 
Income Tax Act as of the date the 1977 amendments thereto were promulgated” 
(clause 28). 
 
Thus, according to Clegg (2006: 11), where the OP26 leaseholder has derived capital 
gains in the case of a disposal of its oil and gas right, such a capital gain would likely 
be considered to be “in connection” with prospecting operations and  would therefore 
not be subject to CGT (case law
41
 seems to support that conclusion, though there are 
arguments to the contrary), as CGT was not part of the Income Tax Act as at 1977. 
 
3.4.2 CGT under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
“Oil and gas income” means the receipts, accruals or gains derived by an oil and gas 
company in respect of any oil and gas right, including leasing or disposing of that 
right, thereby including commercial royalty income and capital gains (Clegg, 
2010:348) (refer to 4.3.2 of this dissertation). 
 
The Tenth Schedule (excluding the roll over election in relation to the disposal of an 
oil and gas right) does not exempt the taxpayer from CGT on the disposal of assets. 
 
Therefore, there would be CGT in relation to the disposal of shares in an oil and gas 
company. The CGT implications of the disposal of the shares depend on the makeup 
of the company and the tax residency of the shareholders. South African tax residents 
are subject to CGT on any capital gain realised on the disposal of shares held on 
capital account.
42
 Shareholders that are not tax resident in South Africa, however, are 
                                                 
40
 Definition of “natural oil”, in Section 1 of the ITA: “means any liquid or solid hydrocarbon or 
combustible gas existing in a natural condition in the earth’s crust, but does not include coal or 
bituminous shales or other stratified deposits from which oil can be obtained by destructive distillation 
(such as coal-to–liquids technology), or gas arising from marsh or other surface deposits.” 
41
 Minister of Finance  v De Beers (Pty) Ltd  2006 (69 SATC 105) 
42















only subject to CGT on any capital gain realized on the disposal of shares if 80% or 
more of the market value of the shares is attributable directly or indirectly to 
immovable property situated in South Africa. Oil and gas rights are considered to be 
immovable property
43
 for this purpose (Clegg, 2010:353). 
 
Accordingly, the OP26 regime is more favourable than the Tenth Schedule in relation 




3.5.1 Ring-fencing under the OP26 regime 
 
The Income Tax Act provides for several measures to ring-fence the deductibility of 
mining capital expenditure. 
3.5.1.1 Ring-fencing by industry 
 
The deduction for capital expenditure in relation to any mine or mines is limited to the 
taxable income derived from mining. Any excess of accumulated capital expenditure 
which is not deductible (“unredeemed capital expenditure”) is carried forward and 
deducted in succeeding years against the taxpayer’s taxable income from mining. This 
is known as the mining ring-fence. The effect of this limitation is to prevent the 





The mining ring-fence did not apply in 1977. A company which earned other income 
(for example income from manufacturing) could, therefore, deduct mining capital 
expenditure from such income and thereby reduce its overall tax burden. 
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 The application of CGT to non-residents in terms of paragraph 2(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule , 
specifically includes immovable property situated in the Republic held by the non-resident or any 
interest or right of whatever nature of that non-resident to or in immovable property situated in the 
Republic.  
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It is submitted that this means that the deduction under the current Income Tax Act is 
less favourable than the deduction available under the Income Tax Act as at 1977. 
Therefore, the mining ring-fence will not apply under OP26 if so elected by the OP26 
leaseholder. 
 
3.5.1.2 Ring-fencing by mine 
 
Until 1984, a company which operated more than one mine could set off its 
unredeemed capital expenditure on one of its mines against mining income of another 
mine where both mines had already commenced production. However, a limitation 
was then introduced in terms of which the deduction is limited, in relation to any one 
mine, to the amount of taxable income derived by the taxpayer from mining that 
particular mine (subject to certain exceptions).
45
 This is known as the capital 
expenditure per mine ring-fence. 
 
The expenditure per mine ring-fence did not yet apply in 1977 and should not affect 
an OP26 Mining Lease granted pursuant to OP26, if so elected by the OP26 
leaseholder. 
 
Accordingly, under the OP26 mining lease, the more beneficial 1977 dispensation 
would be adopted to ensure that ring-fencing does not apply. 
 
3.5.2 Ring-fencing under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
There is ring-fencing under the Tenth Schedule by industry to a limited extent in that, 
any assessed losses
46
 from exploration or production may only be set-off against oil 
and gas income, and income derived from the refining of gas. If any amount remains 
after setting-off the assessed loss against such income, an amount equal to 10% of the 
remaining assessed loss may be set-off against any other income
47
 derived by that 
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 Section 36(7F) of the ITA. 
46
 Paragraph 5(3) of the Tenth Schedule 
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 For example income derived from ancillary trades such as the leasing of excess building space, the 
purchase and sale of oil to cover contractual short-falls and management fees from managing oil and 

















 Any losses remaining after off-set against any other income may be 




No restrictions are imposed under the Tenth Schedule which ring-fence the losses of a 





The ring-fencing provisions under the Tenth Schedule are accordingly not as 
favourable as the dispensation enjoyed by oil and gas companies under the OP26 
regime (refer to 3.5.2 of this dissertation). 
 
3.6 Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses 
 
3.6.1 Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses under the OP26 regime 
 
Special rules for the taxation of foreign exchange gains and losses were first 
introduced in the Income Tax Act in 1978 with the introduction of section 24B. 
Subsequently, the provisions of section 24B were replaced in their entirety by the 
provisions of section 24I of the Income Tax Act. 
 
The Income Tax Act as at 1977 did not contain specific legislation governing the 
taxation of the foreign exchange gains and losses. Accordingly, foreign exchange 
gains and losses were taxed in terms of the general capital/ revenue and accrual/ 
incurral provisions. Thus, where an OP26 lessee borrowed funds in order to undertake 
prospecting/mining operations, any realised foreign exchange gain arising would be 
taxable, and any realised foreign exchange loss arising would be tax deductible, 
depending on whether the borrowing was more closely linked to the financing of a 
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 Paragraph 5(4) of the Tenth Schedule 
49
 Paragraph 5(5) of the Tenth Schedule 
50
 Section 36(7E), (7F) and (7G) of the ITA. 
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In contrast under the current Income Tax Act, a taxpayer is liable to account for both 
realised and unrealised foreign exchange gains in terms of the provisions of section 
24I. Foreign exchange gains and losses only arise where the OP26 lessee has not 
transacted in its “local currency”. “Local currency” is defined (inter alia) as the 
currency of the Republic or the currency used by a foreign company with a permanent 
establishment for purposes of its financial reporting.
52
 Where a taxpayer undertakes 
its financial reporting in South African Rands and borrows funds in a foreign currency 
(such as United States Dollars) to undertake its exploration/production activities from 
an offshore rig/production platform in South Africa (defined as a “permanent 
establishment”)
53
 then foreign exchange gains and losses, be it realised or unrealised 
(unrealised gains and losses being accounted for at the end of each financial year), are 




3.6.2 Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
In terms of paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, currency gains and losses of a 
company must be determined solely with reference to the currency and translation 
method used by that company for financial reporting purposes. As a result, United 
States Dollar-based oil and gas companies can use the Dollar as their base currency 
for determining currency gains and losses for tax purposes. Notwithstanding this, all 
taxes due to South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) must be translated to South 
African Rands at the “average exchange rate” for the year and must be paid to SARS 
in Rands.
55
 An oil and gas company may change the currency used for financial 
reporting with approval of SARS, only if SARS is satisfied that the company is not 
changing the currency solely or mainly to reduce its tax liability. 
                                                 
52
 Definition of “local currency” paragraph (a), section 24I of the ITA 
53
 Definition of “permanent establishment”, section 1 of the ITA: “permanent establishment” means a 
permanent establishment as defined from time to time in Article 5 of the Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Article 5 of the OECD model tax convention provides that for the purposes of this Convention, the 
term "permanent establishment" means a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. The term "permanent establishment" includes especially at 
sub-paragraph (f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural 
resources. 
54
 Section 24I of the ITA. Refer to 3.6.2 of this dissertation for the tax treatment under the Tenth 
Schedule. 
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Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule attempts to maintain the relief provision provided 
by OP26, of companies not being taxed on foreign currency gains or losses, as a 
consequence of the fact that section 24I of the current Income Tax Act did not exist in 
the Income Tax Act as at 1977. 
 
The Tenth Schedule falls short of this aim in that it provides that foreign currency 
gains and losses are determined with reference to the currency and translation method 
used by that company for financial reporting purposes. For example, for financial 
reporting purposes unrealised foreign currency gains and losses are recognised on 
translation (namely financial year-end).  The OP26 prospecting and OP26 prospecting 
sub-lease lessees were taxed in accordance with the Income Tax Act as at 1977 and 
accordingly would not recognise unrealised foreign exchange gains or losses for tax 
purposes. 
 
3.7 Customs Duties 
 
3.7.1 Customs duties under the OP26 regime 
 
There are generous exemptions in the OP26 mining lease from Customs and Excise. 
Clause 10.1 of the OP26 mining lease provides that: 
“SOEKOR and its contractors may during the continuance of this Mining 
Lease and subject to the provisions of international trade agreements which 
may be in force, import into the Republic of South Africa or clear from any 
customs and excise warehouse under rebate of full customs duty (as defined 
in the Customs and Excise Act, 1964) such equipment, machinery, materials, 
instruments, supplies and accessories (excluding refined petroleum products 
for use in road vehicles and any goods imported by SOEKOR and any of its 
contractors for the personal use of its personnel) as are required for use in 
















A similar clause is found in the OP26 prospecting sub-leases, clause 25.5.3. 
Accordingly, an OP26 leaseholder will not suffer customs and excise duties on 
equipment and machinery used in the exploration for, or production of oil and gas. 
 
3.7.2 Customs duties under the Customs and Excise Act 
 
Under the Customs and Excise Act, 1964, equipment, machinery, materials, 
instruments, supplies and accessories utilised in the exploration of oil and gas 
imported under rebate item 460.23 are exempt from customs and excise duty.  
 
The current tax dispensation for customs duties is accordingly not dissimilar to the 
dispensation under the OP26 regime. 
 
3.8 Value Added Tax (“VAT”)  
 
3.8.1 VAT under the OP26 regime 
 
Value Added Tax (“VAT”) is levied at the rate of 14%. It is levied on supplies by a 
vendor of goods or services and on the importation of any goods or services into 




 to prospecting and mining operations. The limitation to the 
Income Tax Act as at 1977 is limited to income tax. The OP26 Mining Lease 
precludes other taxes on the income of miners, or taxes of a similar nature, calculated 
in relation to taxable income, profits or turnover from mining operations. It is 
submitted that VAT is not a tax on income, or a similar tax. Therefore, VAT would 
apply to mining operations (Arthur Anderson, 1993:18).  
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 SARS VAT ruling 64 (28/3/1-5 May 1992) states that input VAT may be claimed in respect of 
prospecting expenses, if these expenses were incurred in the course or furtherance of an “enterprise”. 
Section 23(3)(d) of the VAT Act allows a company to register for VAT in circumstances where the 
company  is continuously and regularly carrying on an activity which, in consequence of the nature of 
that activity, can reasonably be expected to result in taxable supplies being made for a consideration 
only after a period of time and where the total value of taxable supplies to be made can reasonably be 















The applicability of VAT is likely to benefit a prospector or miner, at least during the 
investment phase of the project, since it entitles the oil and gas company to receive a 
refund of the VAT element of purchases (in the form of an input tax credit).  
 
Some commentators have suggested that VAT is a tax on turnover
57
 and hence is 
specifically excluded under the OP26 mining lease and that OP26 leaseholders would 
be exempt from VAT. It is submitted that this interpretation is incorrect as VAT is 
levied at “Vatable transaction” level and not on the turnover of a taxpayer.   
 
3.8.2 VAT under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
Clegg (2010:354) states that the normal VAT rules apply to oil and gas companies. 
Briefly, VAT liability enables rand-based expenditures to qualify for VAT credit as 
input VAT. Sales of crude oil are zero-rated (no VAT charge applies). Gas does not 
qualify for zero rating. 
 
3.9 Deductions   
 
The distinction between capital and revenue expenses is important in South African 
tax law, since capital expenditure may usually not be deducted for tax purposes unless 
specifically allowed.  Capital expenses
58
 can generally be regarded as those expenses 
                                                 
57
 The OP26 mining lease (clause 23.6) provides the following in relation to mining operations: 
 “Any payments to the State in terms of clause 23 hereof, shall constitute SOEKOR’s (which 
includes sub-lessees, joint venturers, etc in terms of clause 1(n) of the Mining Lease) only 
commitment to the State, or any political sub-division thereof, for taxes or levies on the 
income derived by SOEKOR from the mining of natural oil […]” 
The clause further provides the lessee, its sub-lessees and its joint venturers shall not be liable for: 
 Any further taxes on income derived from mining; 
 Any similar taxes calculated with reference to taxable income, profits or turnover; 
 Any profit-sharing, royalty or lease consideration; 
 Non-resident shareholders’ tax (NRST) (which was abolished from 1 October 1995), dividend 
withholding tax or tax on profits remitted to non-residents; 
 Undistributed profits tax (which was abolished on 31 March 1990). 
58
 An expense is considered to be of a capital nature if, for example:  
 It adds to the taxpayer’s income-earning structure (New State Areas Ltd v CIR (1946 AD 610) 
(14 SATC 155)) 
 It is a once-off expense from which future benefits (income) will flow (CIR v George Forest 















incurred to set up the structure of a business (cost of the mine, cost of equipment, etc), 
while revenue expenses would be those expenses required for the day-to-day running 
of the business (salaries, rent, interest, etc). Capital expenses in relation to mining 
companies are categorised as: 
 Prospecting (or exploration) capital expenditure;59 and 
 Mining (or production)60 capital expenditure.61 
 
3.9.1 Deductions under the OP26 regime 
 
3.9.1.1 Operating expenses 
 
Operating expenses were tax deductible under the general deduction formula as 
contained in section 11(b) of the Income Tax Act as at 1977 or they may be 
deductible under section 11(a) of the current Income Tax Act. The most relevant 
requirements for deductibility are that the expenses must be: 
 Actually incurred;62 
                                                                                                                                            
 It creates an enduring benefit or advantage for the taxpayer (Atherton v British Insulated and 
Helsby Cables Ltd (1926 AC 205) (10 SATC 155)) 
(Huxham & Haupt, 2009: 99) 
59
 “Prospecting expenditure” is not defined in the Income Tax Act. The meaning of prospecting 
expenses is inferred from section 15(b) of the Income Tax Act as including expenses arising from 
surveys, wells and other exploration work preliminary to the establishment of a mine and expenses 
incidental to such prospecting operations. 
60
 The definition of “Production” in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule includes – 
 “(a) the separation of oil and gas condensates; 
   (b) the drying of gas; and 
   (c) the removal of non-hydrocarbon constituents, 
   to the extent that these process are preliminary to refining;” 
61
 In the context of mining taxation, “mining expenditure” is interpreted as being synonymous with the 
defined term “capital expenditure”, in section 36(11) of the ITA. “Capital Expenditure” is defined  as 
expenditure (other than interest or finance charges) on shaft sinking and mine equipment[…] and, in 
the case of a natural oil mine, the cost of laying pipelines from the mining block to the marine terminal 
or the local refinery, as the case may be.  Interest and finance charges are specifically excluded from 
the determination of “capital expenditure” in the ITA. 
62 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR (1936 CPD 241) (8 SATC 13): 
at page 15. – “[. . .] the words of the statute [i.e. section 11(a) are ‘actually incurred’ not ‘necessarily’ 
incurred. The use of the word ‘actually’ as contrasted with the word ‘necessarily’ may widen the field 
of deductible expenditure. For instance, one man may conduct his business inefficiently or 
extravagantly, actually incurring expenses which another man does not incur; such expenses, therefore, 
are not ‘necessary’ but they are actually incurred and therefore deductible.” 
In CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 110 (A) (55 SATC 198) (in the Court a quo ITC 1499 
(53 SATC 266)) it was held that when an expenditure is the subject of a bona fide dispute, it lacks the 















 In the production of the income;63 




 Not be of a capital nature. 
 
Operating expenses incurred whilst still in the prospecting stage (namely pre-trade 
revenue expenses) are accumulated until the mining stage (namely trade commences), 
and then the total is claimed as single deduction
65
. 
3.9.1.2 Prospecting capital expenditure 
 
Prospecting expenses under the OP26 regime would be deductible under section 
15(b)
66
 of the Income Tax Act as at 1977, provided that such expenditure was 
incurred in the Republic. 
                                                                                                                                            
SATC 83) (on appeal as Nasionale Pers Bpk v KBI 1986 (3) SA 549 (A) (48 SATC 55) the taxpayer, a 
company, claimed a deduction for the portion of annual bonuses it considered to be appropriate to the 
period ending on the last day of each year of assessment. Its employees, however, could at those dates 
make no claim for bonuses, becoming eligible for them some months later. It was held that no liability 
existed at the relevant dates and that there was no expenditure actually incurred. 
In Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR 1988 (3) SA 876 (A) (50 SATC 81 at 90) (on appeal from CIR v Edgars 
Stores Ltd 1986 (4) SA 312 (T) (48 SATC 89)), it was held that only expenditure in respect of which 
the taxpayer had incurred an unconditional legal obligation during the year of assessment in question 
may be deducted in terms of section 11(a) from income returned for the year. Where the existence of a 
liability is certain and established within the tax year in question, but the amount of the liability cannot 
be accurately determined at the tax year-end, in which event the liability is nevertheless regarded as 
having been incurred in the tax year in question. 
63
 In Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR (1936 CPD) a broad test as to whether an expense 
is incurred in the production of income was laid down. An expense is in the production of income in a 
business operation if any one of the following requirements are met- 
 The expense is necessary for the performance of the business operation 
 The expense is attached to the business operation by chance 
 The expense is genuinely incurred for the purpose of carrying on the business operation more 
efficiently. 
(Huxham & Haupt, 2009: 97) 
This test was slightly modified in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) 1955 AD (20 SATC 113), and approved in 
CIR v African Oxygen Ltd 1963 (1) SA 681 (AD) at 688, and in CIR v Allied Building Society, 1963 (4) 
SA 1 (AD) at 13 (25 SATC 343). 
64
 The application of section 23(g) is the ratio decidendi in case of Joffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1946). 
Joffe & Co. (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1946 AD 157) (13 SATC 354) provides at page 357 (quoted with approval 
from the English case of Strong & Co. Ltd v Woodifield (1906) AC): “It is not enough that the 
disbursement is made in the course of, or arises out of, or is connected with the trade or is made out of 
the profits of the trade. It must be made for the purpose of earning the profits.” 
And at page 359. “[. . .] the Court is not concerned with deductions which may be considered proper 
from an accountant’s point of view or from the point of view of a prudent trader, but merely with the 
deductions which are permissible according to the language of the statute.” 
65
 Section 11A of the ITA. 
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Under the OP26 regime, OP26 prospecting lease and OP26 prospecting sub-lease 
holders are taxed under the source basis of taxation (as was the basis of taxation in 
South Africa prior to 1 January 2001). The “Republic” is not defined under the OP26 
lease. For purpose of the OP26 regime, the Republic is accepted in common law as 
extending only 12 nautical miles from the coastline. The mining and prospecting lease 
area under the OP26 regime covers the territorial waters and the continental shelf of 
the Republic.  The lease areas therefore extend beyond the Republic. Accordingly, 
OP26 prospecting lease holders may not receive a tax deduction under section 15(b) 
until such time as they enter into an OP26 mining lease. Under the OP26 mining lease 




The question  arises as to whether  the prospecting expenditure incurred under an 
OP26 prospecting lease or OP26 prospecting sub-lease outside the Republic could be 
regarded as deductible capital expenditure as envisaged in section 36(11) of the 
Income Tax Act.  Section 15(b)(iii) of the Income Tax Act provides that “any 
expenditure which has been allowed in terms of this paragraph (section 15(b)) shall 
not be included in such person’s capital expenditure as defined in subsection (11) of 
                                                                                                                                           
(b) Any expenditure incurred by the taxpayer during the year of assessment on prospecting operations 
(including surveys, boreholes, trenches, pits and other exploratory work preliminary to 
establishment of a mine) in respect of any area within the Republic in respect of which a mining 
lease has been granted by the State, together with any other expenditure which in the opinion of 
the Secretary is incidental to such operations:  Provided that- 
(i) […] 
(ii) In the case of any company that derives income from different classes of mining 
operations, the deduction under this paragraph shall be made from the income 
derived from such class or classes of mining operations and in such proportions as 
the Secretary may determine; 
(iii) Any expenditure which has been allowed to be deducted from the income of any 
person in terms of this paragraph shall not be included in such person’s capital 
expenditure as defined in sub-section (11) of section thirty-six. 
67
 Section 9(1)(cA) of the ITA deems any amount derived under a contract for the disposal of any 
mineral, including natural oil, by the taxpayer in the course of mining operations carried on by him 
under the mining authorisation granted under the Minerals Act, 1991 (Act No. 50 of 1991)  or  
prospecting right, mining right, exploration right or production right or mining permit issued in terms 
of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (Act No. 28 of 2002), to be from a 
South African source, irrespective of where the contract was made or where the mining operations are 
carried on. Furthermore, the OP26 mining lease at clause 23.5 provides that: 
“SOEKOR (includes any sub-lessee, joint venturer, etc) shall maintain a permanent 
establishment in the Republic of South Africa and arrange its affairs in such a manner that all 
the profits from mining for natural oil under this Mining lease will be attributable to that 
establishment.” 
Accordingly, offshore mining income within the Republic (as then defined) derived under an OP26 
















section thirty six”. Thus, where expenditure is denied under section 15(b), it may 
apparently be claimed under section 36(11) of the Income Tax Act.  
 
 Meyerowitz (2006: 23) states that: “Prospecting expenditure in an area where a 
mining lease has been granted by the State is not allowable under section 15(b) and 
will only be allowable if it is of a nature falling within the meaning of capital 
expenditure under section 36(11).” 
 
Whilst Silke (1978, para 669) states to the contrary, that “where prospecting 
operations are conducted in any area in the Republic in which a mining lease has 
been granted, or in other appropriate circumstances, prospecting expenses must be 
included with capital expenditure deductible from the income of the particular mine in 
the same manner and to the same extent as is all other capital expenditure”. Similarly 
in the current service edition (De Koker (ed), 2009: para 16.8), the author notes as 
follows: “Any expenditure deductible deducted under s15(b) may not be included in 
the taxpayer’s ‘capital expenditure’ as defined in s36(11) (s15(b)(iii)). Were it not for 
this prohibition, prospecting expenses would be included with capital expenditure 
deductible in the same manner and to the same extent as is all other capital 
expenditure”. 
 
“Capital expenditure” does not, it is submitted include all expenditure which is of a 
“capital nature” but only the particular expenditure as defined in section 36(11) of the 
Income Tax Act, which cannot be construed to include “prospecting expenditure”. As 
such the denial of the prospecting deduction under section 15(b) of the Income Tax 
Act would result in the taxpayer being unable to claim any tax deduction for 
prospecting expenditure until the OP26 prospecting lease or OP26 prospecting sub-
lease holder has entered an OP26 mining lease. 
 
Clause 23.5.1 and 23.5.2 of the OP26 mining lease provide that: 
 “In calculating the taxable income referred to in this clause 23, the deductions from 
income shall be granted in the Income Tax Act as at the date on which the 1977 
amendments thereto were promulgated, and shall in any event include: 
 the costs expended by the Lessee itself on prospecting operations within the 















 the costs expended by the Lessee itself on the prospecting operations within 
the area covered by the Mining Block in any tax year or part thereof.” 
 
Therefore prospecting expenses incurred by a taxpayer who has been granted an OP26 
mining lease are deductible under the provisions of the OP26 mining lease. However 
at the time that the prospecting expenditure is incurred, the taxpayer’s tax liability 
should be governed by the terms of the OP26 prospecting lease and not the OP26 
mining lease. Thus all prospecting expenditure should be deducted only in the year in 
which mining operations commence. Such a result would however be contrary to a 
fundamental principle of tax, that the “tax is an annual event”
68
 and as such 
expenditure must be deducted in the year of incurral (Clegg, 2006:9). It is submitted 
that prospecting expenditure is deductible as incurred
69
 and will create an assessed 
loss to be set off against future income.  
 
It should be noted that clause 23.8 of the OP26 mining lease provides that “in 
determining the taxable income or profits in respect of the Mining Block, the phrase 
mining for ‘Natural Oil’ shall be interpreted as including all prospecting, 
development and exploitation activities and such taxable income or profits shall be 
taxed as set out in this clause 23.” Accordingly, prospecting expenditure is deductible 
in terms of the OP26 mining lease as and when incurred, and will accordingly result 
in the taxpayer creating an assessed loss, to be offset against future mining income. 
This provision however is limited to determining the “taxable income or profits in 
respect of the Mining Block” and thus would not apply in determining the taxable 
                                                 
68
 In Sub Nigel Ltd v CIR (1948 AD)  it was said: 
 “For the whole scheme of the Act shows that, as the taxpayer is assessed for income tax for a 
period of one year no expenditure incurred in a year previous to the particular year can be 
deducted.” 
In Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CIR (1942 CPD), the company claimed as a deduction certain expenditure 
relating to directors’ expenses which had arisen in earlier years. The court held that the expenditure 
should have been claimed in the years in which it arose, and that, by not doing so, the company had 
forfeited its right to claim a deduction in terms of s11(a). 
In the Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR (1975 AD), Botha JA in his judgement made the following statement: 
 “It is only at the end of the year of assessment that it is possible, and then it is imperative, to 
determine the amounts received or accrued on the one hand and the expenditure incurred on 
the other during the year of assessment.” 
69
 Expenses that are incurred prior to and in preparation for the carrying on a trade are typically not 
deductible (CSARS v Contour Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1999 (61 SATC 447)). However certain provisions 
















income or profits from areas in the OP26 prospecting lease which fall outside the area 
of the OP26 mining lease (Clegg, 2006:9). 
 
The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (“the Commissioner”) may 
direct that expenses under section 15(b) of the Income Tax Act must be deducted in a 
series of annual instalments. This discretion is not subject to objection and appeal, but 
in practise this discretion is rarely exercised by the Commissioner. 
 
The sub-section also provides for a potential “matching” (at the Commissioner’s 
discretion) of deductions where different classes of mining
70
 are involved. This 
discretion although rarely used in practice, is not subject to objection and appeal 
 
In the Income Tax Act as at 1977, the Commissioner did not have the discretion to 
direct the deduction of prospecting expenses over a series of annual instalments, nor 
to direct the matching of deductions with different classes of mining. It is construed 
therefore that in relation to OP26 mining leases, the taxpayer is likely to elect the 
treatment of a deduction under the provisions of section 15(b) as at 1977. 
 
3.9.1.3 Mining capital expenditure 
 
Deductions from income derived from mining
71
 activities are regulated by section 
15(a) of the Income Tax Act, which states that these deductions should be determined 
in accordance with section 36.   
 
The mining expenditure that is deductible in terms of section 15(a) and section 36
72
 of 
the Income Tax Act includes, inter alia, expenses on: 
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 For example, the Commissioner may direct that prospecting expenses from natural oil mining may 
not be set off against income arising from diamond mining. 
71
 Definition of “mining operations” and “mining” in section 1 of the ITA, “includes every method or 
process by which any mineral is won from the soil or any substance or constituent thereof.” 
72
 Section 36(11) of the ITA as at 1977: 
(11) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) expenditure on shaft sinking and mine equipment and, in the case of a natural oil 
mine, the cost of laying pipelines from the mining block to the marine terminal or the 
local refinery, as the case may be; and 
(Paragraph (a) substituted by s28(1)(b), Act 85, 1974, in terms of s70 of that Act first effective 















                                                                                                                                            
(b) expenditure on development, general administration and management (including any 
interest and other charges payable after the thirty first day of December, 1950, on 
loans utilised for mining purposes) prior to the commencement of production or 
during any period of non-production; and 
(c) in the case of any […] natural oil mine, an amount calculated […] in the manner 
prescribed for the calculation of the capital allowance provided for in section 26(2) of 
the Mining Rights Act, 1967 (Act No.20 of 1967), at the rate  of […] six per cent per 
annum in the case of […] any natural oil mine […] on the amount of the unredeemed 
balance of the aggregate of- 
(i) the expenditure referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b), excluding any interest 
and other charges on loans referred to in paragraph (b), if the mine is […] a 
natural oil mine […] ; 
(ii) the amount (if any) allowed to rank as capital expenditure in terms of section 
37; 
(iii) any expenditure incurred during any period of production of development on 
any reef on which at the date of such development stopping has not yet 
commenced; and 
(iv) the amount calculated in terms of this paragraph up to the end of year of 
assessment immediately preceding the year of assessme t under charge, if 
the mine is […] a natural oil mine, for the period from the end of the month 
in which the expenditure is actually incurred or is in terms of proviso (dd) to 
this paragraph deemed to be incurred, up to the end of the year of assessment  
immediately preceding the first year of assessment in respect of which the 
determination of the taxable income derived from the working of such mine 
does not result in an assessed loss, […]: Provided that- 
(aa) the amount under this paragraph shall not be calculated for any period 
during which mining operations are not carried on in accordance with 
the terms of the relevant lease; 
(bb)   notwithstanding anything to the contrary in an law contained, the   
amount under this paragraph shall not be taken into account for the 
purpose of calculating the capital allowance as provided for in section 
26(2) of the Mining Rights Act,1967, or for the purpose of 
determining the profits of which a share is payable to the State in 
terms of any mining lease; 
(cc) the provisions of section 26(3) and (4) of the Mining Rights Act, 
1967, shall, in so far as they can be applied, apply mutates mutandis 
for the purpose of determining the unredeemed balance of the 
aggregate of the amounts referred to in subparagraphs (i) to (iv), 
inclusive, of this paragraph; 
(dd) for the purpose of subsections (3) and (3)bis of this section any 
amount calculated under this paragraph in respect of any year of 
assessment shall be deemed to be capital expenditure incurred on the 




‘capital expenditure incurred’, for the purpose of determining the amount of capital 
expenditure incurred during any period of in respect of any mine, means the amount (if any) 
by which the expenditure that is incurred during such period in respect of such mine and is 
capital expenditure, exceeds the sum of the amounts received or accrued during the said 
period from disposals of assets the cost of which has in whole or in part been included in 
capital expenditure taken into account (whether under this Act or any previous Income Tax 
Act or any Income Tax Ordinance of the territory) for the purpose of any deduction in respect 
of such mine under section 15(a) of this Act or the corresponding provisions of any previous 
Income Tax Act, or in the case of a company, under the said section or section 11(2)(i) of the 
Income Tax Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance No.10 of 1961), of the territory, or the 
corresponding provisions of any previous Income Tax Ordinance of the territory; 
















(a) Shaft sinking and mine equipment;73 
(b) Cost of laying pipelines from the mining block to the marine terminal or local 
refinery or to the onshore processing facility;
74
 
(c) Expenditure on development, general administration and management 
(including any interest and other charges on loans utilised for mining 




(d) Costs76 incurred in connection with: 
 Viability studies; 
 The design, procurement, management (including project 
management), transport and construction of the constituent 
parts (from after raw material stage and including the piles and 
other foundations) of any marine or onshore receiving 
installations erected or to be erected on the mining block or 
onshore with a view to exploration of the natural oil; 
 Costs of training of personnel for any purpose in connection 
with the abovementioned installations, at any time prior to the 
successful commissioning of such installations but excluding 
any assets belonging to another taxpayer; 
(e) A capital allowance of 12% per annum on the unredeemed portion (namely the 
portion not yet recovered through the earning of  mining revenues) of virtually 
all the expenditure referred to above, excluding interest and other charges on 
loans, calculated from the end of the year before the mine becomes taxpaying 
(as opposed to being in a loss position);
77
 and 
(f) Expenditure on various qualifying assets such as mine housing, mine 
hospitals, schools, and other facilities owned and operated by the taxpayer for 
the benefit of its employees.
78
 The current Income Tax Act requires deduction 
of this expenditure to be spread in equal instalments over ten years (five years 
                                                                                                                                            
‘expenditure’ means net expenditure after taking into account any rebates or returns from 
expenditure, regardless of when such last-mentioned expenditure was incurred. 
(Definition inserted by sec.21(d), Act 65, 1973) 
73
 Section 36(11)(a) of the ITA. 
74
 Section 15(a) of the ITA as at 1977. 
75
 Section 36(11)(b) of the ITA. 
76
 Clause 23.7.2(c) of the OP26 Mining Lease 
77
 Section 36(11)(c) of the ITA as at 1977. 
78















in the case of motor vehicles), the Income Tax Act as at 1977 did not include 
such a limitation. Therefore, these costs are deductible in full when incurred 
under the OP26 regime. 
 
Some of the above categories are interpreted widely, and include items that may not 
appear to be included at first glance. For instance according to Van Blerck (1990:12-
7), shaft sinking costs can include expenditure incurred on mining access, equipping 
the shaft, handling of materials, sub-surface equipment, treatment and utility plant, 
civil engineering services, architectural services, mechanical and electrical services, 
refrigeration and financial costs. 
 
Although mining equipment is not defined in the Income Tax Act, the South African 
Revenue Service has allowed a broad interpretation to include all surface equipment, 
administrative buildings, processing plants and storage buildings owned by the 
taxpayer (Van Blerck, 1990:12-11).  
 
It is also important to note that the equipment should consist of tangible assets and 
that intangible assets would not qualify for deduction (Van Blerck, 1990: 12-11). In 
terms of the International Accounting Standard 38 (2004: 1571), an intangible asset is 
defined as an “identifiable non-monetary asset without physical substance”. In the 
mining context, intangible assets may include items like patents, goodwill and mining 
licences (Ramboll, 2009: 11). 
3.9.1.4 Refining capital expenditure 
 
The definition of “oil and gas company” includes a company that is engaged in the 
refining of gas derived from an “oil and gas right”.
79
 Refining capital expenditure is 
depreciated over a 4 year period on the basis of 40:20:20:20.
80
 The balance of capital 
equipment is depreciated over the expected useful life of the asset
81
. Industrial 
                                                 
79
 Definition of “Oil and Gas Company” as contained in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule to the ITA 
prior to 30 September 2009. 
80
 Section 12C of the ITA 
81

















 and commercial buildings
83





 are depreciated over 10years and 20years respectively. 
 
3.9.2 Deductions under the Tenth Schedule Regime 
 
3.9.2.1 Operating expenses 
 
Paragraph 5(1) of the Tenth Schedule provides that for the purposes of determining 
the taxable income of an oil and gas company during a year of assessment, there will 
be allowed as deductions from its oil and gas income all expenditure and losses 
actually incurred (other than any expenditure or loss actually i curred on the 
acquisition of an oil and gas right, except as allowed in paragraph 7(3)) in that year of 
exploration or production. 
 
3.9.2.2 Exploration86 and Production capital expenditure 
 
Capital expenditure on exploration or production is fully deductible, in terms of 
paragraph 5(1), but also qualifies for a percentage “uplift” in terms of paragraph 5(2). 
 
Paragraph 5(2) of the Tenth Schedule allows for the deduction of 100% of the 
expenditure of a capital nature actually incurred in a year in respect of exploration and 
it allows for the deduction of 50% of capital expenditure incurred in respect of 
production. Essentially, capital expenditure in respect of exploration
87
 receives a 
                                                 
82
 Section 13 of the ITA 
83
 Section 13quin of the ITA 
84
 Section 12D of the ITA 
85
 Section 12F of the ITA 
86
 Definition of “Exploration” as contained in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule; means the 
acquisition, processing and analysis of geological and geophysical data or other related activity for the 
purpose of defining a trap to be tested by drilling together with well drilling, logging and testing 
(including extended well testing) up to and including the field appraisal stage. 
87 In the context of exploration expenditure, it is understood that SARS accepts that all expenditure 
incurred by a company during its exploration phase, will be deductible unless it is overhead 
expenditure of a corporate (as opposed to operational) nature.  
The cut-off between expenditures incurred in respect of exploration and production respectively, must 
be determined in relation to those terms as defined in the Tenth Schedule and not necessarily by 















200% super deduction and capital expenditure in respect of production receives a 
150% super deduction. No deduction may be claimed in terms of paragraph 5(2) in 
respect of expenditure incurred for the acquisition of an oil and gas right.  
 
Mitchell (2007:82) states that the “uplift” acts as an incentive to invest in high-risk, 
high-cost capital expenditure that probably represents long-term sunken capital. 
Exploration is given a higher uplift due to the higher nature of the risk (and to 
compensate for the fact these losses will probably not be useable against income for a 
longer period than production expenses). 
 
Prospecting (“Exploration”) and Mining (“Production”) capital expenditure is 
deductible in full under both the Tenth Schedule and OP26 regime. Accordingly, this 
core aspect of the OP26 regime has been retained. (Refer to 4.4 of this dissertation in 
which the additional tax deductions in relation to capital expenditure are examined).  
 
3.9.2.3 Refining capital expenditure 
 
The Tenth Schedule applies only to an “oil and gas company”. The Tenth Schedule, 
when first added by section 63(1) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2006 
defined an oil and gas company as any company that: 
 “(a) (i) holds any oil and gas right;
88
 or 
        (ii) engages in  exploration or production in terms of any oil and gas 
            right; or 
       (iii) engages in refining of gas
89
 derived in respect of any oil and gas right 
            held by that company; and 
(b) engages in no trade other than any of the activities contemplated in item 
      (a)” 
                                                                                                                                            
legislation. A production licence may be granted at a point in time which does not align with the 
termination of ‘exploration’ from a taxation perspective (Clegg, 2010 at 20.9). 
 
88
 Definition of “oil and gas right” as contained in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule; means any 
reconnaissance permit, technical co-operation permit, exploration rights or production right as 
contemplated in Section 1 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (Act No 28 
of 2002), or any right or interest therein. 
89
 Definition of “Gas” as contained in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule; means any subsoil 
combustible gas, consisting primarily of hydrocarbons, other than hydrocarbons converted from 
















It is apparent from the above definition of “oil and gas company”, that any 
exploration or production which takes place in a company conducting other activities, 
would be taxable (with the income from those other activities) in terms of the general 
provisions of the Income Tax Act, without having regard to the provisions of the 
Tenth Schedule.  
 
The narrow scope of the definition of “oil and gas company” was aimed at preventing 
taxpayers engaged in any trade
90
 other than the specified activities in the definition 
from accessing the enhanced capital allowances (and certain other favourable tax 
treatments) for “oil and gas companies”, as well as the possibility of entering into a 
“fiscal stability agreement” which will preserve those advantages for a regulated 
period of time. 
 
Clegg (2008: A-1) states that subsequent to the promulgation of the Tenth Schedule in 
2006, it becomes apparent that the normal commercial activities of a company 
prospecting for/or producing oil and gas, or refining gas results in the derivation of 
revenues from incidental activities outside of those specified in the definition. 
Although it may be argued on the basis of case law
91
 that such activities do not 
constitute separate trades, a negative interpretation by SARS would be destructive to 
the financial viability of most participants in the industry. Accordingly, a submission 
was made to National Treasury for an amendment to the Tenth Schedule. This 
proposal was adopted by National Treasury. 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum, 2009 at 70, indicates that the “oil and gas company” 
definition was too narrowly defined and takes an all-or-nothing approach. A company 
engaging in any trade that is not stipulated in the oil and gas company definition 
prevents the benefits of the Tenth Schedule. This prohibition applies even to ancillary 
trades normally associated with oil and gas exploration and production. These 
ancillary trades include the leasing of excess building space, the purchase and sale of 
                                                 
90
 Definition of “trade” in section 1 of the ITA, “includes every profession, trade, business, 
employment, calling, occupation or venture, including the letting of property and the use of or the grant 
of permission to use any patent, or any design, or any trademark or any copyright, or any other property 
of a similar nature. 
91















oil to cover contractual short-falls and management fees from managing oil and gas 
joint ventures. No reason, according to the Legislature, exists to prevent the 
application of the Tenth Schedule merely because a company engages in ancillary 
trades normally associated with oil and gas exploration and production.  
 
Accordingly, the definition of “oil and gas company” was amended on 30 September 
2009 so as to eliminate the all-or-nothing approach.
92
 The prohibition against 
impermissible trades was dropped. This amendment was not made retrospective as its 
purpose was to clarify the intention of the Legislature, namely that  the Tenth 
Schedule applies to companies that hold a South African oil and gas right.  
 
In the absence of the retrospective amendment the question arises whether in lieu of 
the allowances provided for refining capital expenses (as documented in 3.9.1.4 of 
this dissertation), a company engaged in the refining of gas
93
 could have claimed 
refining capital expenses in full under paragraph 5(1). Paragraph 5(1) of the Tenth 
Schedule allows the deduction of expenditure and losses actually incurred by an oil 
and gas company. The author submits that such a deduction would not be allowed 
under paragraph 5(1) as the nature of expenditure envisaged is expenditure “in respect 
of exploration or production”. 
 
3.9.2.4 Operator cost recoveries 
 
When there is more than one participant in a mining block, a joint operating 
agreement (“JOA”) is executed. The JOA governs how the mining block is to be 
operated and how costs are to be shared between the participants. In addition, one of 
the participants is designated in the JOA as the operator of the mining block and the 
other participants as non-operators. The operator is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the mining block. 
                                                 
92
 An oil and gas company is defined in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule as any company that; 
“ (i) holds any oil and gas right; or 
   (ii) engages in exploration or production in terms of any oil and gas right” 
 
93
 The definition of oil and gas company as contained in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule, prior to 30 
September 2009, specifically included any company that “engages in refining of gas derived in respect 
















A practical difficulty that arises in relation to the JOA is that the agreed costs sharing 
may be different to the participation percentage. Accordingly, there will be a 
mismatch between the proportionate income and the proportionate expenditure 
incurred. This creates the opportunity for possible tax avoidance.  
 
For example, South Africa does not have a system of Group Taxation. Each corporate 
entity is treated as a separate tax payer. There is a tax advantage to be gained where 
one participant from the same group of companies is in a tax assessed loss position 
(typical of a new entrant) and the other in a tax paying position (typical of an oil and 
gas company with a producing asset). A lower proportionate share income is received 
by and a higher proportion of expenses is incurred by, the participant in the taxpaying 
position. 
 
Costs are typically incurred by the operator in carrying out the day-to-day operations 
of the mining block. The operator then invoices its fellow participants in the mining 
block for a reimbursement of their agreed sharing of the costs. The timing of cost 
reimbursements at tax year-end can often result in a mismatch of the tax treatment of 
the costs in the tax calculation of the operator and the tax calculations of the non-
operators. 
 
For example, the operator has paid all the expenses and is able to claim a deduction of 
the expenses paid, but unless the operator has invoiced for the recovery of a portion of 
the expenses, typically it will not set off the re-imbursements or recognise them as 
income until the next tax year. The non-operators are obligated to reimburse the 
operator as agreed in the JOA and according might claim a deduction in respect of 
such amounts payable even before an invoice is received or a payment made.  
 
It is submitted that the JOA creates an immediate shared incurral of expenditures and 
that invoicing by the operator does no more than notifying the non-operators, 





















Sunley et al. (2002:4) cautions governments in relation to the dangers of transfer 
pricing in relation to erosion of the government take of profits from oil and gas 
mining.  
Sunley et al. (2002:4) states that:  
“Through transfer pricing, a taxpayer seeks to minimize income and maximize 
deductible expenditures in high-tax jurisdictions and vice versa in low-tax 
jurisdictions.  
A transfer pricing mechanism that could affect revenue in the oil and gas 
sector is the creative use by firms of price hedging mechanisms, perhaps 
involving transactions between related parties, causing great difficulty in 
assessing whether hedging instruments are used for transfer pricing purposes 
rather than to reduce risk.  
More common measures to maximize expenditure deductions include:  
• The provision by related parties of highly leveraged debt 
finance at above-market interest rates.  
• Claiming excessive management fees, deductions for 
headquarter costs, or consultancy charges paid to related 
parties.  
• The provision of capital goods and machinery in leasing 
arrangements at above-market costs charged by a related-party 
lessee.  
• If the petroleum tax rate is above the standard tax rate, there 
may be an incentive to establish a domestic shell firm that will 
on-lend financing capital from related parties to the oil 
company, giving rise to an interest deduction at a higher tax 

















Abusive transfer pricing can be very difficult to detect and prevent. Properly 
designing the tax code, though, is an important first step. At a minimum, the 
tax legislation should include safeguards requiring that transactions between 
related parties be assessed on an arms-length basis, or perhaps that certain 
deductions be capped as a share of total costs. Some countries also impose a 
limit on the allowable (for tax purposes) debt-leverage of a project.”  
 
3.10.2 Transfer Pricing and Thin Capitalisation under the OP26 regime 
 
The thin capitalisation and transfer pricing provisions for goods and services supplied 
between connected persons were introduced in the Income Tax Act in 1995. As these 
restrictions on the deductibility of expenses and interest were promulgated post 1977, 
it is anticipated that the taxpayer would elect under the OP26 regime (at clause 26 of 
the OP26 mining lease and similarly at clause 28 of the OP26 prospecting sublease 
agreement) that the Income Tax Act as at 1977 should apply.
94
 Accordingly the 
taxpayer under OP26 is not subject to either the thin capitalisation or transfer pricing 
provisions.  
 
3.10.3 Transfer Pricing under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
Transfer pricing is not specifically mentioned in the Tenth Schedule and the 




                                                 
94
 Clause 26 of the OP26 mining lease provides that “Except to the extent exempted in terms of Clause 
23, Lessee shall, throughout the term of this Mining Lease, be liable for income tax payments to the 
State on the annual taxable income derived by it from prospecting and mining for Natural Oil and 
transactions in connection therewith in accordance with Income Tax Act as of the date the 1977 
amendments thereto were promulgated”.  
 
Similarly clause 28 of the OP26 prospecting sub-lease provides that: “Except to the extent exempted, 
Lessee shall throughout the terms of this Sub-Lease, be liable for income tax payments to the State on 
the annual taxable income derived by it from prospecting for Natural Oil and transactions in 
connection therewith in accordance with the Income Tax Act as of the date the 1977 amendments 















The provisions of section 31(2) of the Income Tax Act provide as follows: 
 where goods or services 
 are supplied or acquired 
 in terms of an international agreement 
 and the acquirer is a connected person in relation to the supplier 
 and the price of the goods or services is not an arm’s length price (i.e. market 
value
95
 in circumstances) 
 the Commissioner may adjust the price to an arm’s length price in calculating 
the taxable income of the acquirer or supplier. The adjustment may further be 
subject to STC (as if the value were distributed from a subsidiary company). 
 The exercise by the Commissioner of his discretionary powers is subject to 
objection and appeal (Huxham & Haupt, 2009: 423). 
 
An “international agreement” is defined in section 31 of the Income Tax Act as a 
transaction, operation, or scheme entered into between 
 A resident  and any other person who is not a resident; or 
 A person who is not a resident and any other person who is not a resident for 
the supply of goods or services to or by a permanent establishment of either of 
such persons in the Republic; or 
 A person who is a resident and any other person who is a resident for the 
supply of goods or services to or by a permanent establishment of either of 
such persons outside the Republic. 
‘ 
The participants in a mining block are typically companies from groups of companies 
that are independent / un-associated to each other. The section 1 definition of 
“connected person” in the Income Tax Act does not specifically address participants 
in a joint venture, but it is construed that for income tax purposes that the joint 
venture
96
 may be seen as a “partnership” on the basis that it’s “members share in 
                                                 
95
 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd  v Mahdi and another 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA): 
 “Market value is the price that an informed willing buyer would pay to an informed willing 
seller for the property having  regard to all its potential at the time of sale” 
96
 A distinction is often drawn between the term “partnership” and the term “joint venture“. 
Although joint venture agreements may contain a statement that they are not to be construed as a 
partnership, joint ventures generally meet all the requirements of a partnership and may, where 















profits and losses according to their members share in the partnership”.
97
 The impact 
of this interpretation is that all transactions between participants in the mining block 
are seen to be transactions with connected persons and accordingly participants may 
be called to justify the arm’s length price of their activities in the joint venture where 
one (or more) of the participants is a non-resident for tax purposes.  
 
It is not uncommon for foreign incorporated companies to carry out their oil and gas 
activities through a registered
98
 branch in South Africa. Transfer pricing legislation 
does not apply to the dealings between a company and its own branch because a 
company and a branch are the same entity, and a branch is not defined as a 
“connected person”.
99
 However, this does not mean that companies can ignore the 
arm’s length principle when interacting with their branch. 
 
In SARS Practise Note 7 at paragraph 6, SARS indicates that it will apply the 
principles of section 31 to the dealings between a company and its own branch in the 
application of the DTA’s entered into by South Africa. Tax treaties address the 
concept of transfer pricing so that profit can be properly allocated between tax treaty 
partners. Under the tax treaties (typically Article 9), transfer pricing adjustments arise 
if the terms and conditions of transactions between associated companies differ from 
the terms and conditions that would have occurred between independent companies. 
Once triggered, the tax treaty allows for profits to be adjusted to reflect the profits that 
would have arisen had arm’s length terms and conditions been initially applied 
(Explanatory Memorandum in respect of the draft Taxation Amendment Bill, 
2010:96).  
 
3.10.4 Thin Capitalisation under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule provides a “safe harbour” against the thin 
capitalisation rules found elsewhere in the Income Tax Act. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
parties concerned intend to pursue a single venture only, for example, in the mining industry joint 
ventures are often formed for the purpose of prospecting for mineral deposits (Pedregal, 2009:18). 
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 ITC 1794 (2005) (67 SATC 262) 
98
 Registered with CIPRO 
99















Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule provides that for purposes of determining the 
taxable income of an oil and gas company during a year of assessment, the 
Commissioner may not disallow a deduction of expenditure for loans, advances and 
debts (or for any other financial assistance
100
) on the grounds that these loans, 
advances and debts are excessive in relation to its fixed capital (as determined on the 
last day of its year of assessment), unless 
 An interest-bearing loan, advance or debt was owed during that year by it to a 
person who is its connected person, and 
 All interest-bearing loans, debts and advances contemplated above in the 
aggregate exceed an amount equal to three times its total fixed capital (being 
its share capital, share premium and accumulated net realised and unrealised 
profits) as calculated on the last day of the company’s year of assessment. 
 
This paragraph has the purpose of fixing a 3:1 ratio rule for thin capitalisation rather 
than leaving it to negotiation and the practise note
101
 as is the case with other 
taxpayers 
102
 under section 31(3) of the Income Tax Act. 
 
The thin capitalisation “safe harbour” involves two basic steps: 
 First, the oil and gas company determines whether it owes interest-bearing 
loans, advances or debts to its connected person. In terms of paragraph 6(3), 
loans, advances or debts are interest bearing for a particular year only if they 
bear interest during that year. 
 Secondly, the loans, advances or debts are measured against the total fixed 
capital of the company. 
 
The Commissioner may, in terms of paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule, disregard 
excessive levels of debt if that excess occurs only for a temporary duration
103
. 
                                                 
100
 The author submits that “indirect financial assistance” as contemplated in section 31(3) of the 
Income Tax Act will enjoy the “safe harbour” under paragraph 6(1). The ambit of paragraph 6(1) is 
wide, specifically including “any other financial assistance”. 
101
 To date the 3:1 ratio has only been contained in the SARS Practice Note 2 – 14 May 1996, 
paragraph 4.1.  
102 In accordance with SARS Practice Note 2, the Commissioner in general accepts a 3:1 debt:equity 
ratio.  However, on application the Commissioner may exercise his discretion and accept a different 
ratio. In practice it is understood that an 8:1 ratio has been accepted in the case of branches of foreign 



















The Tenth Schedule does not preserve the tax treatment under OP26 in its entirety. It 
satisfies existing investors, even if only on a “swings and roundabouts” basis. 
 
Refer to Annexure A for a table of the similarities between the OP26 regime and the 
Tenth Schedule regime. 
 
The Tenth Schedule affords similar tax benefits to the OP26 regime in relation to tax 
rates, STC, VAT, customs duties, the deduction of operating expenses, the deduction 
of exploration and production expenses. The Tenth Schedule provides for comparable 
(but not equally favourable) tax benefits in relation to the tax treatment of foreign 
exchange gains/ losses and the ring-fencing of mining assessed losses (dealt with in 
further detail at 4.3 of this dissertation). Furthermore, there are short-comings in 
relation to Capital Gains Tax. The Tenth Schedule affords relief from CGT limited 
only to the rollover election available on the disposal of oil and gas rights
104
 (dealt 
with in further detail at 4.5 of this dissertation). The Tenth Schedule offers very 
limited relief from thin capitalisation in the form of a “safe harbour” rule and no 
exemption from transfer pricing. Under the OP26 regime, the OP26 lessee could opt 
that neither thin capitalisation, nor transfer pricing provisions should apply.     
 
Whilst there are similarities between the tax benefits offered to oil and gas companies 
under the OP26 regime and the Tenth Schedule, it cannot unequivocally be stated that 
companies engaged in the exploration for and production of oil and gas enjoy the 
same, if not more favourable, tax dispensation under the Tenth Schedule than under 
the OP26 regime. In fact, provisions such as thin capitalisation and transfer pricing 
                                                                                                                                            
103
 This is in alignment with SARS Practise Note 2 at 6.2. “Where a taxpayer, therefore, can justify a 
higher level of financial assistance in contrast with the guideline ratio of financial assistance to fixed 
capital or a higher interest rate under particular or special circumstances, he may approach the 
Commissioner, to exercise his discretion in terms of section 31. This will, generally be of a temporary 
nature and a period may be specified within which the 3:1 ratio should be restored or the interest rate 
be reduced”.  
104















are unfavourable in comparison to the OP26 regime.  In chapter 4, the significant 















CHAPTER 4 – SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE OP26 
REGIME AND THE TENTH SCHEDULE REGIME 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Sunley et al. (2001:1) states that oil and gas extraction plays a dominant role as a 
source of export earnings and, to a lesser extent, employment in many developing 
countries. But the most important benefit for a country from the development of the 
oil and gas sector is likely to be its fiscal role in generating tax and other revenue for 
the government. To ensure that the state as resource-owner receives an appropriate 
share of the economic rent generated from extraction of oil and gas, the fiscal regime 
must be appropriately designed.  
  
The government, as resource owner, has a valuable asset in the ground. This asset (a 
crude oil or natural gas deposit) can only be exploited once. In order to convert this 
asset into financial resources, the government must attract capital on terms that ensure 
it gets the greatest possible value for its resources under uncertainty about what the 
value of the resources will turn out to be.  
 
There is a fundamental conflict between oil and gas companies and the government 
over the division of risk and reward from a petroleum project. Both want to maximize 
rewards and shift as much risk as possible to the other party. Oil and gas agreements 
and the associated fiscal rules establish the “price” of the resource in terms of the 
bonuses, royalties, taxes or other payments the investor will make to the government 
over the life of the project. Designing fiscal arrangements that encourage a stable 
fiscal environment and efficient resource development maximize the magnitude of the 
revenues to be divided. 
  
In designing fiscal instruments, the government will need to weigh its desire to 
maximize short-term revenue against any deterrent effects this may have on 
investment. This will require a balanced sharing of risk and reward between the 
investor and the government (Tordo, 2007:13): 
 Governments typically aim to obtain the maximum value (not volume) for 















maximize the wealth from their natural resources and, at the same time, 
attract foreign investment. Governments also have development and socio-
economic objectives, such as job creation, transfer of technology, and 
development of local infrastructure. 
 Oil and gas companies aim to ensure that the return on capital is consistent 
with the risk associated with the project and with the strategic objectives of 
the corporation. 
Sunley et al. (2001:1) advises that governments should aim for a fair and rising 
government share of the resource rent, without scaring off potential investors.  
 
This chapter examines the primary concerns of existing investors in the upstream oil 
and gas sector in relation to the taxation of the exploration for and production of oil 
and gas in South Africa and makes recommendations for probable solutions.  
 




Sunley et al.(2002:8) indicates that given the nature of investment in oil and gas 
extraction (namely: long term, large-scale and up-front) a particular concern for 
investors is to guard thems lves against unforeseen changes to the financial premises 
of the project. One safeguard mechanism that is often sought by investors is the 
inclusion of a fiscal stability clause in the project agreement. While this to the 
government can seem an attractive and, in the short run, inexpensive way of 
minimizing investor risk, it does limit the government’s flexibility to set tax policy, 
potentially resulting in a revenue loss and increased administrative costs.  
 
Fiscal stability clauses come in different forms. One approach is to “freeze” the tax 
system at the time of the project agreement. If the tax system is later changed, this 
will imply a special treatment of a particular taxpayer, adding to the administrative 
burden, especially if several projects are operating under different tax systems. 















will be offset by a reduction in another tax (or in principle by paying a compensatory 
subsidy), which perhaps better preserves the integrity of the tax system. Still, it may 
be quite difficult in practice to agree on compensatory measures that can satisfy both 
government and investor. There are also some stability clauses that are asymmetric: 
protecting the investor from adverse changes to the fiscal terms but passing on 
benefits of economy-wide reductions in tax rates.  
 
Fiscal stability clauses are widespread in the oil and gas sector. Of 109 countries 
surveyed in 1997 by Barrows, a majority (63 percent) provided fiscal stability clauses 
for all fiscal terms (see Annexure A of this dissertation). A small group (14 percent) 
had partial fiscal stability clauses excluding income tax. Finally, a minority (23 
percent) did not provide any fiscal stability clauses, in project agreements (at least up 
until 1997). However, this does not prevent an investor from seeking to renegotiate 
fiscal terms in response to policy changes. A recent example of a country, which 
repealed its tax stability clause for contracts signed from 2002 onwards, is that of 
Kazakhstan. Tax conditions set in contracts may now be adjusted in compliance with 
amendments to tax laws, by the mutual consent of the government and the contractor.  
 
4.2.2 Fiscal stability under the OP26 regime 
 
Under the OP26 regime all the taxes were guaranteed within the lease agreement, 
granting definitive assurance to the OP26 leaseholder of fiscal stability. There was no 
need for an investor to search exhaustively for all the fiscal legislation and then seek 
guarantee agreements in respect of each separate tax. 
 
In general under the OP26 mining lease, the taxpayer is taxed in terms of the Income 
Tax Act as at 1977.  Furthermore, the taxpayer may claim tax deductions that are 
more favourable, as between the Income Tax Act as at 1977 and the current Income 
Tax Act. 
The OP26 mining lease restricted the taxpayer’s tax burden to income tax only. 
Furthermore, it prevented the introduction of new unfavourable legislation, such as 

















4.2.3 Fiscal stability under the Tenth Schedule regime 
 
Paragraph 8(1) of the Tenth Schedule provides that the Minister of Finance, after 
consultation with the Minister of Energy, may enter into agreements that contractually 
bind the State with an oil and gas company guaranteeing that the provisions of the 
Tenth Schedule, as at the date that the agreement was entered into, will continue to 
apply for the duration of that company’s oil and gas right. 
 
Paragraph 8(2) ensures that fiscal stability will remain if exploration rights are 
renewed or are converted into production right. 
 
Paragraph 8(6) of the Tenth Schedule provides that: “If the State fails to comply with 
the terms of the fiscal stability agreement and that failure has a material adverse 
economic impact
105
 on the taxation of income or profits of the oil and gas company 
that is party to the fiscal stability agreement, the oil and gas company is entitled to 
compensation for the loss of market value caused by that failure (and interest at the 
prescribed rate) or to an alternative remedy that otherwise eliminates the full impact 
of that failure.” 
 
A copy of the standard memorandum of agreement for fiscal stability is attached as 
Annexure B of this dissertation. 
 
The short-comings of the fiscal stability agreement envisaged in the Tenth Schedule 
are:  
1. The agreement does not encompass all taxes levied on an oil and gas 
company. The approach taken by National Treasury in replacement of the 
fiscal stability available under the OP26 regime appears to be the insertion of a 
fiscal stability clause for each tax impacting on the oil and gas sector (for 
example, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, No 28 of 2008). 
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 Paragraph 8(6) is problematic since there is no indication of what would constitute a “material 
adverse economic impact”. Presumably a “material adverse economic impact” would have an after tax 
effect of greater than 10% of taxable income for an “oil and gas company”, before triggering 















2. The agreement does not prevent the introduction of new taxes in relation to an 
oil and gas company.  For example a windfall profits tax or export duties on 
crude oil. 
3. The agreement does not allow for the transfer of fiscal stability to third parties 
once the taxpayer has entered into production. In terms of clause 24.1 of the 
OP26 prospecting sub-lease agreement, the principle was established that an 
oil and gas company may transfer all or part of its rights, duties and 
obligations under the sub-lease to any other oil and gas company, this includes 
fiscal stability in relation to the OP26 mining lease. 
 
The Tenth Schedule at paragraph 8 provides for the transfer of the fiscal stability 
agreement rights in relation to: 
 
• Disposals of exploration rights (paragraph 8(2)(a)) 
• Disposals within the same group (paragraph 8(2)(b)) 
• Changes in participating interest percentage (paragraph 8(3)) 
 
 A concern of existing investors in the upstream oil and gas sector in relation to fiscal 
stability is that, in relation to the disposal of a production right, the Tenth Schedule at 
paragraph 8(2)(b) limits the transfer of fiscal stability agreement rights to any other 
oil and gas company. This concern is articulated in a submission to National Treasury 
on behalf of OPASA for a proposed amendment to the Tenth Schedule (Futter, 2010: 
A-3). 
 
South Africa competes with other destinations for new entrants.  South Africa’s poor 
geological attractiveness of producing assets may deter a new entrant.  This coupled 
with the fact that the new entrant does not enter on a level playing field to existing 
participants, may further deter new entrants.  True fiscal stability is assurance that the 
legislative treatment is stable, predictable and uniform to all participants. 
 
Changes to the participants in an oil and gas right are internationally not uncommon at 
















1. A participant’s intention to refocus its activities and resources to better 
producing opportunities (often outside South Africa), 
 
2. Increases in operating costs that can no longer be afforded, 
 
3. Decisions to invest in further capital to enhance recovery that cannot be 
afforded by all participants. 
 
4. A participant choosing to reduce the investment risk where the economic 
returns do not warrant further expenditure. 
 
5. A participant’s realignment of its core business (typical for companies focused 
on exploration and not production).  In such instances, participation in a 
producing asset will be sold out to a company specialising in production. 
 
The transferability of fiscal stability agreement rights impacts on the marketability of 
a production right.  Any new participant to a production right will not share the fiscal 
stability enjoyed by original participants.  Accordingly, the new participant will not 
operate on an equal footing to its partners. 
 
This inequity can also influence the decision making of the joint venture after a new 
participant’s entry, for example where the economics of further investment to enhance 
recovery proves to be unviable for one of the participants because of a difference in 
fiscal treatment. 
 
OPASA has requested that in the spirit of alignment with the OP26 regime, the 
assignment of fiscal stability agreement rights on disposal of an oil and gas right to 
any other oil and gas company should be extended to production rights. Their 
proposed amendment to the Tenth Schedule was as follows (Futter, 2010:A3-4): 
 
“Sub-paragraph (2)(a) and paragraph (2)(b) of paragraph 8 of the Tenth 
Schedule should be substituted with the following sub-paragraph: 
8(2) In the case of a disposal of an oil and gas right as defined in sub-















agreement as contemplated in subparagraph (1) in respect of that right 
may, as part of that disposal assign all of its fiscal stability rights in 
terms of that agreement relating to the oil and gas right disposed of, to 
any acquiring gas company.” 
 
The suggested wording consolidates exploration and production rights to the defined 
term “oil and gas right” in sub-paragraph 8(7) of the Tenth Schedule and 
correspondingly eliminates the distinction in relation to the assignment of fiscal 




The author proposes an alternative solution for existing investors in the oil and gas 
sector where there is no amendment to the legislation. The disposal of an investment 
in an oil and gas block is typically either by disposal of a participation in the mining 
block (or part thereof) or shares in a company that holds the mining block. The 
restriction on the disposal of fiscal stability agreement rights whilst in production does 
not extend to a change in shareholding in the oil and gas company. 
 
If it is the intention of the legislature to prevent the transfer of fiscal stability in 
relation to a producing asset, anti-avoidance measures would need to be introduced to 
prevent taxpayers from registering multiple companies for the purpose of holding 
their participation in each mining block, where the taxpayer wants to preserve the 
ability to dispose of an investment in a producing asset with the fiscal stability. 
 
The secondary concern of existing investors in relation to paragraph 8(2)(b) of the 
Tenth Schedule is that it allows for the transfer of the fiscal stability agreement within 
the same group of companies, as opposed to affiliates as defined in the MPRDA. 
 
Section 1 of the Income Tax Act, defines “group of companies” as two or more 
companies of which one company (namely the controlling group company) directly or 
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 The term “acquiring company” has been used in the proposed wording in substitution for “other oil 
and gas company”. An oil and gas company is defined in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule as a 
company that holds any oil and gas right. This definition prejudices new entrants that do not hold an 
existing oil and gas right. Although, it may be argued that upon acquiring a participation in a 
production right the new entrant simultaneously becomes an oil and gas company as defined and 
















indirectly holds shares in at least one other company (namely the controlled group 
company), to the extent that at least 70% of the equity shares of each controlled group 
company are held directly by the controlling group company, one or more other 
controlled companies or any combination thereof. 
 
The Mineral Petroleum and Resources Development Act, 2002 (“MPRDA”) provides 
for the transfer of a mining or production right to an “affiliate”.  An “affiliate” is 
defined for MPRDA purposes as a company that owns, or is owned by the MPRDA 
mining or production rights holder.  “Owns” and “owned” mean ownership directly or 
indirectly of more than 50% (fifty percent) of the voting shares or member’s interests. 
 
With effect from 1 Jan 2009, section 41 of the Income Tax Act provides that “group 
of companies” means a group of companies as defined in Section 1, but specifically 
excludes from the “group of companies” definition any association, corporation or 
company incorporated under the law of any country other than the Republic or any 
body corporate formed or established under such law. 
 
The concern of existing investors in relation to the above definitions is that there is 
inconsistency between the MPRDA and the Income Tax Act.  An oil and gas 
company may seek the transfer of a mining or production right to an affiliate in terms 
of the MPRDA, but a corresponding transfer of the fiscal stability agreement is not 
possible where the equity holding is less than 70%. 
 
A transfer of a mining or production right to another group company takes place 
simultaneously with the transfer of the fiscal stability agreement. However, the group 
rules in the Income Tax Act which provide relief in relation to income tax 
recoupments, CGT roll-overs, non-supplies for VAT purposes, exemptions from 
stamp duties and transfer duties do not apply in relation to foreign companies.  This is 
a problem when the bulk of upstream oil and gas exploration in Southern African 
territorial waters is undertaken by, or jointly with, the subsidiaries or branches of 
foreign companies. 
 
Accordingly, OPASA has requested that paragraph 8(2)(b) should accommodate the 















Furthermore, OPASA has requested that the definition of group of companies in 
Section 41 of the Income Tax Act must be refined to specifically include affiliates, as 






In terms of paragraph 5(3) of the Tenth Schedule, when determining the taxable 
income of an oil and gas company, “any assessed losses (as defined in section 20) in 
respect of exploration or production may only be set-off against the oil and gas 
income, and income derived from the refining of gas by that company to the extend 
those losses do not exceed that income”. 
 
To the extent that any assessed loss remains after the set-off as set out above, 
paragraph 5(4) provides that 10% of the remaining assessed loss may be set off 
against any other income, which does not constitute oil and gas income. 
 
The expression “oil and gas income” means the receipts, accruals or gains derived by 
an oil and gas company in respect of any oil and gas right, including the leasing or 
disposal of that right, 
 
The intention of the Legislature at paragraph 5(3) of the Tenth Schedule is to preclude 
the taxpayer from setting off assessed losses in respect of oil and gas exploration or 
production against income other than oil and gas income, and income derived from 
refining
107
 of gas (i.e. ring-fence oil and gas mining losses).  
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 The term “refining” is important in relation to consideration of what constitutes “income derived 
from the refining of gas” as envisaged in paragraph 5(3) of the Tenth Schedule. 
Whilst the Tenth Schedule no longer contains a definition of refining (it was removed 30 September 
2009), the author has based the definition of refining on the definition provided  in the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act, 2006.Gas refining activities is defined as those activities necessary to convert the gas 
to a finished refined product such as diesel, petrol (“mogas”), kerosene (“illuminating paraffin”), liquid 
petroleum gas (“LPG”), naphtha, alcohols, ethanol, distillates and propane. These process are described 
as: 
a) The fractional distillation, 
b) Chemical processing, 
















It is not uncommon for companies engaged in the exploration for oil and gas to hold 
large cash deposits. Because of the high risk nature of exploration activities external 
funding of such activities by financial institutions are rare, accordingly companies 
typically fund these activities using their own cash resources.  Existing investors in 
the oil and gas sector are concerned that interest income derived from these cash 
balances would be construed as non-oil and gas income and subject to the 10% ring-
fencing.  
 
Their concern stems from the example provided in the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2006
108
 in which “bond interest”
109
 on working 
capital is provided as an example of the functioning of the ring-fencing provided for 
in paragraph 5(4) of the Tenth Schedule. The revenue authorities may interpret this 
example to imply that all investment income received by an oil and gas company is to 
be treated as income other than oil and gas income.  
The example furnished in the Explanatory Memorandum (2006:19) is as follows: 
 Facts.  
Oil and Gas Company generates 192 million U.S. dollars in oil production receipts plus 
another 25 million in U.S. dollars from bond interest on working capital. Oil and Gas 
Company incurs 80 million U.S. dollars in oil operating expenditures as well as 60 million 
U.S. dollars for oil capital expenditures (i.e. for a new oil rig). 
 
Result.  
Oil and Gas Company has total oil losses of 200 million U.S. dollar ($80 million plus $120 
million (i.e. $60 million times 2)). This $200 million amount completely offsets the $192 
million amount, leaving an $8 million excess. Of this $8 million excess, $800 000 can be used 
to offset the $25 million in U.S. dollar working capital income. At the end of the day, Oil and 
Gas Company is taxed on the $24.2 million of interest income ($25 million – $800 000) and 
has $7.2 million of excess oil and gas loss ($8 million – $800 000) as a carry forward into the 
following year. 
                                                                                                                                            
d) Product blending to meet fuel specification or 
e) Any combination thereof.   
108
 At 19 
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4.3.2 The meaning of oil and gas income 
 
An oil and gas mining assessed loss may be offset against oil and gas income, and 
against income derived from the refining of gas. Oil and gas income is income 
derived by an oil and gas company “in respect of” an oil and gas right. The question 
that therefore needs to be answered, is whether investment income could be regarded 
as income derived in respect of an oil and gas right or income “derived from” 
refining. 
 
The term “in respect of” has been interpreted by the courts in a number of cases, in 
the context of different statutes, and has not been given a consistent meaning. It seems 
clear that the particular meaning to be ascribed to the term depends upon the context 
in which it is used.
110
 While it seems clear that the phrase requires a causal 
connection, the context in which it is used dictates whether it is to be given a wider
111
 
or a narrower meaning
112
 and whether or not it requires a direct relationship.
113
 
Unfortunately, it is not absolutely clear what  meaning should  be given to the words 
“in respect of” in the context of the definition of “oil and gas income”.  
 
The term “derived from” is understood to generate a direct causal link between the 
income and the source from which it arises.  This implies that the income derived 
must be directly connected to the oil and gas mining operations.
114
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 In CIR v Crown Mines Ltd 1923 AD 121, Solomon JA, said a p.128, ‘Now the words in respect of 
may be used in various senses, and in each case it is essential to examine the context in order to 
ascertain the sense in which it is used’. 
111
 In Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Raubenheimer 31 SATC 209, it was concluded that “if 
the phrase and consequently the subsection is reasonably capable of two constructions, that the 
construction should be placed on it which favours the taxpayer”.  
112
 In Ernst v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1954 (1) SA318 (A) at 323 C-E it was held that one 
should adopt a strict construction of the empowering legislation where a class of taxpayers is 
privileged. The Tenth Schedule provides class privileges to oil and gas companies and hence the 
definition of oil and gas income should have a narrow interpretation.  
113
 In Rabinowitz & Anor v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 1958 (3) SA 619 (A), Schreiner JA said 
the following at 631: “But expressions like ‘in respect of’ and ‘in connection with’ , though they may 
sometimes be used to cover a wide range of association, must in other cases be limited to the closer or 
more direct forms of association indicated by the context”. 
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 In CIR v D & N Promotions (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 296 (A) the court considered two amounts of 
interest received by a farming company engaged in sugar cane farming. The first amount of interest 
















4.3.3 Investment income 
 
To understand the meaning of oil and gas income, from a case law prospective in 
relation to interest income, the oil and gas industry should consider the case of 
Western Platinum Ltd v C:SARS (2004) 4 All SA 611 (SCA). In this decision, the 
court had to determine in what circumstances interest may be characterised as 
“income derived by the taxpayer from mining operations” in order to determine the 
applicability of section 15(a), read with section 36(7C) of the Act, where certain 
capital expenditure is allowed to be deducted from the “income derived by the 
taxpayer from mining operations”.  
 
The court held that section 36(7C) did not refer to “mining” or “mining operations”, 
but referred specifically to “income derived from the working of any producing 
mine”. It found that this expression (which appears to be more focused than the 
expressions “mining” and “mining operations”) leaves no doubt that to constitute 




The conclusion was that in order to be mining income (i.e. income derived from 
mining operations) as contemplated in section 36(7C) of the Income Tax Act, the 
income must be derived from the business of extracting minerals from the earth. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
interest was paid to the taxpayer by a sugar mill on the retention of a portion of the purchase price of 
sugar cane supplied to it. 
In this case, the counsel for the Commissioner of Inland Revenue argued that the moneys retained by 
the miller were a form of investment which carried interest and that the interest did not, thus, constitute 
income derived from farming operations. The court disagreed with this argument and stated: 
“I find this argument far-fetched. It is true that if a farmer invests surplus funds, even funds 
derived from farming operations, then interest paid on the investment would not normally be 
regarded as income derived from farming operations, but the present case is a far cry from that. 
The interest receipt does not derive from an investment of surplus funds: it is part and parcel of a 
scheme devised for the remuneration of the farmer for the sugar cane delivered by him to the 
miller.” 
Further the court held that for income to have been derived from farming operations, it is necessary for 
that income to be derived directly from farming operations. En causu, it was found that the interest paid 
on the amount due in respect of the delivery of the sugar cane was paid as part of the purchase price 
and was therefore farming income. 
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Conradie JA accepted, in paragraph (7), that in order to qualify as mining income, the 
income had to be directly connected to the mining source and said the following in 
paragraph (8): 
“(8) […] income which is directly connected to a mining source qualifies as 
mining income; an intermediate investment of such income, putting it to work 
as capital, generally breaks the direct connection” 
 
The legislation relating to mining income, however, is narrower in definition than that 
referring to oil and gas income. If the relevant specific phrases (namely “derived [… ] 
from” when considering mining income, and “in respect of” when defining oil and gas 
income) are considered, the phrase “in respect of” requires a connection that may be 
broader between the oil and gas activity and oil and gas income, as opposed to mining 
income, which is required to be directly derived from a mining source. Nonetheless, 
the use of the phrase “in respect of” still requires a close connection, but not 
necessarily as close as is required in Western Platinum Ltd (supra). The case however 
provides valuable guidance and authority for the interpretation of oil and gas income 
in the Tenth Schedule.  
 
With regard to interest earned on money held in a banking account, Conradie JA said 
in Western Platinum Ltd, the following in paragraph (15): 
“If the current accounts had simply been repositories of the proceeds of metal 
sales and interest were earned on credit balances so that such interest was the 
result of an (inevitable) disequilibrium from time to time between outgoings 
from that account and mining income paid into it, the connection between the 
interest and the mining source would be direct. Interest so earned could 
therefore be regarded as a necessary concomitant of the mining operations”.  
 
Accordingly, interest on a bank account in the absence of a cash management 
arrangement with the banks,
116
 and where there are no separate investment decisions 
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 The court in Western Platinum Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service found that 
the interest on Western Platinum Mine’s current accounts was not mining income, because it had 
operated a cash management system by arrangement with its bankers. The cash management system 
compromised twenty six companies and the intervention of a management company. This meant that 
Western Platinum Mine received a rate of interest that it would not have received had it not used the 















or actions which break the link with the oil and gas revenues, may be construed as oil 
and gas income. 
 
With regard to interest earned on amounts placed by the appellant in certain escrow 
accounts, Conradie JA said the following in paragraph (20): 
“In regard to interest on so-called escrow accounts, since this interest arose 
from receipts held by the two foreign banks as part of the security for loans to 
enable the taxpayer to mine, there was a direct connection between the 
interest earned and the operation of mining. The interest was the unavoidable 
result of the way in which the scheme for the remuneration of the appellant 
had been devised. It was not entitled to be paid the price for its metals except 
in accordance with its financing arrangement with the banks. 
Accordingly, the interest earned on the escrow accounts was part and parcel 
of its mining operations as it exhibited the direct connection with those 
operations that qualified it as mining income”.  
 
This implies that, even with the narrow definition of “mining income”, a close enough 
connection may exist to recognise investment income as being derived from oil and 
gas mining and refining.  For instance where funds are earmarked by the taxpayer for 
a specific purpose such as the funding of exploration activities it may be said that the 
interest in respect of these funds follows as an automatic consequence of the 
investment. The dominant purpose of the investment itself is decisive. 
 
Our courts have considered the dominant purpose
117
 approach and identified various 
principles in this regard. One such principle is that when there is any indication that 
the intention or purpose of the taxpayer is mixed, the main or dominant purpose is 
                                                                                                                                            
essence an investment scheme and that the decision to manipulate the accounts broke any direct 
connection that the interest may have had with the mining income. 
117
 In Commissioner of Taxes Southern Rhodesia v Levy,117 the court, while ruling on whether the 
dominant purpose of the taxpayer in acquiring certain shares was to obtain an income-bearing 
investment, and whether the profit made by him on the sale of such shares would accordingly be capital 
in nature, found that the determining factors in resolving the question of capital or income accrual must 
be the main and dominant purpose with which the asset sold was acquired.  
 
A similar conclusion may be drawn in relation to the income generating activity, namely an enquiry in 






















In conclusion, investment income is not to be dogmatically treated as income other 
than oil and gas income, the circumstances of each type of interest income derived by 
the taxpayer should be examined to ascertain whether or not such interest income may 
be regard as “oil and gas income”.   
 
4.4 Additional deductions for capital expenditure 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
According to Van Blerck (1990:13-8), the capital allowance for natural oil mines is an 
incentive for the development of new mines. The allowance partly compensates a 
miner for the delay before the tax deduction takes place. 
Under the OP26 regime, OP26 leaseholders were guaranteed a return on their 
investment in capital expenditure in the form of a tax deductible allowance of 12% 
per annum until such capital expenditure has been redeemed through mining income. 
Under the Tenth Schedule regime, additional tax allowances are provided for in 
respect of exploration and development capital expenditure, at rates of 100% and 50% 
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 Commissioner of Taxes Southern Rhodesia v Levy 18 SATC 127 
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 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v SIR (50 SATC 98). 
A portion of the judgment of African Life Investment Corporation v Secretary for Inland Revenue is 
quoted in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Tod, where the court decided on the nature of the 
proceeds of the sale of shares where a taxpayer bought shares for the purpose of the dividend to be 
declared on those shares: 
“I shall not attempt a precise definition of the distinction, but there would, I consider, be such a 
main purpose where there is a further purpose simultaneously pursued by way of an additional, 
albeit subsidiary, activity calculated and intended to yield a profit. Where, for instance, a company 
whose main concern as an investor is an income from dividends, confines its purchases to sound 
equities with the highest dividend yield, but, at the same time, intends, in order to increase its 
income, to sell whenever it is able to do so at a substantial profit, that intention, although so 
closely connected with its main object that it may be said to be inseparable from it, would not 
ordinarily rank as merely incidental to such a dominant purpose”. 
and the court concludes that “for there to be an ‘absolving dominant purpose’, it must be shown that the 
‘pursuit of an overriding main objective of securing a dividend income merely provides the occasion 
















respectively. These capital allowances are deductible in the year that the capital 
expenditure is incurred and may create tax oil and gas mining tax assessed losses. 
 
4.4.2  Unredeemed capital expenditure allowance 
 
Mining capital expenditure is divided into two categories: 
 Pre-production expenditure and 
 Production expenditure 
 
Pre-production expenditure can be seen as expenditure preliminary to the 
establishment of a mine (Meyerowitz, 2006:22). 
 
Both categories of mining capital expenditure are deductible under section 15(a) of 
the Income Tax Act, read in conjunction with section 36 of the Income Tax Act (refer 
to 3.9 of this dissertation). 
 
For the purpose of this discussion, specific focus is given to the additional allowance 
provided for in respect of unredeemed capital expenditure in section 36 (11)(c) of the 
Income Tax Act, colloquially known as the “unredeemed capital expenditure 
allowance”. The unredeemed capital expenditure allowance is a 12% per annum uplift 
on capital expenditure incurred, deducted in each tax year of assessment until such 
capital expenditure has been recovered in full through the receipt of taxable income 
from mining, determined prior to the deduction of this allowance. 
 
See Annexure D of this dissertation for an example of the application of the 
unredeemed capital expenditure allowance. 
 
4.4.3  Tenth Schedule additional capital allowances  
 
The Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act at paragraph 5(1) provides for a deduction 
of expenditure and losses incurred in that year in respect of exploration or production. 
Paragraph 5(2) furthermore allows additional deductions from oil and gas income 















incurred in that year in respect of exploration; and 50 per cent of all expenditure of a 
capital nature actually incurred in that year in respect of production. 
 
These provisions limit the deduction of expenditure and losses incurred to the year of 
assessment in which they are suffered by taxpayer. These provisions do not 
accommodate the deduction of capital expenditure incurred prior to the inception date 
of the Tenth Schedule. 
 
4.4.4  The treatment of pre Tenth Schedule capital expenditure 
 
It has been the policy of National Treasury (and the SARS before that for many years) 
that tax allowances or benefits upon which taxpayers have relied in good faith, should 
not simply terminate, but should be phased out or otherwise compensated for, 
particularly where a taxpayer or industry may be adversely affected. 
 
Historically, transitory legislation introduced by National Treasury (and the SARS) 
has taken various forms. Examples are: 
 Prospective legislation that allows for the accelerated utilization of unredeemed 
balances prior to the effective change such as the change from reducing balance to 
straight-line depreciation under section 11(e),
120
  
 Full-utilization of unredeemed balances at the time of the change-over such as 
GST input claims in the transition to VAT, 
 Valuation of unredeemed balances as a set-off to future tax liabilities such as the 
market value of an asset utilized as the base cost at the inception of CGT, 
 Phasing-in provisions such as the days presence test introduced with the residence 
basis of taxation, 
 Phasing-out provisions such as those typical of tax holidays121  and tax incentives 
with a limited effective period, 
 Change-in-use provisions such as those in respect of the movement of assets into 
or out of trading stock and VAT apportionment for changes to and from 
commercial use, 
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 See SARS Practice Note 19 at paragraph 8 
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 Phasing-out of LIFO as a stock valuation method under section 22(5) of the 
Income Tax Act, and 
 Phasing-in of a new definition of “trading stock” over an 8-year period under 
section 22(3B) of the Income Tax Act. 
 
No transitory tax provisions were legislated in terms of the cessation of the OP26 
regime. Accordingly, there is lack of clarity with regard to whether or not oil and gas 
companies suffer a truncated tax allowance in relation to unredeemed oil and gas 
capital expenditure incurred prior to the inception of the Tenth Schedule. 
 
One interpretation is that upon inception of the Tenth Schedule, the ability of an oil 
and gas company to claim an unredeemed capital expenditure allowance ceased with 
the demise of the OP26 regime. Therefore, the oil and gas company has no continuing 
deduction available in respect of oil and gas expenditure incurred prior to the Tenth 
Schedule. This would appear to be the interpretation favoured by National Treasury 




 of the Income Tax Act provides that any excess (unredeemed) 
capital expenditure is carried forward and is deemed to be capital expenditure 
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 Section 36(7E) of the  ITA: 
The aggregate of the amounts of capital expenditure determined under section (7C) in respect of any 
year of assessment in relation to any mine or mines shall not exceed the taxable income (as determined 
before the deduction of any amount allowable under section 15(a), but after the set-off of any balance 
of assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer in relation to such mine or mines in any previous year which 
has been carried forward from the preceding year of assessment) derived by the taxpayer from mining, 
and any amount by which the said aggregate would, but for the provisions of this subsection, have 
exceeded such taxable income as so determined, shall be carried forward and be deemed to be an 
amount of capital expenditure incurred during the next succeeding year of assessment in respect of the 
mine or mines to which such capital expenditure relates. 
Section 36(7C) of the ITA as at 1977: 
The amounts to be deducted under section 15(a) from income derived during the first year of 
assessment of the taxpayer ending after 31 December 1973( hereinafter referred to as the transition 
year) and succeeding years of assessment from the working of any mine shall be- 
(a) Where such mine commences production during any such year of assessment, the amount of 
capital expenditure incurred up to the close of that year of assessment, and thereafter in 
respect of each succeeding year of assessment, the capital expenditure incurred during such 
succeeding year of assessment; or 
(b) Where such mine commenced production before the commencement of the transition year –  
(ii) the capital expenditure incurred during the year of assessment in question; and 
(iii) where there is in respect of such mine a balance of capital expenditure unredeemed at the 
commencement of the transition year, such amount as may be determined under the provisions 
of subsection (7D) in respect of the year of assessment in question. 















incurred in the next year in respect of the mine to which the capital expenditure 
relates. Accordingly, it may be interpreted that the unredeemed capital expenditure 
balance is deemed to be capital expenditure actually incurred under the Tenth 
Schedule regime. The impact is that although the 12% additional allowance has 
ceased, the taxpayer may now claim a deduction of such capital expenditure under 
paragraph 5 of the Tenth Schedule in full in its first tax year of assessment 
commencing on or after 2 November 2006. In addition, based on whether such 
unredeemed capital expenditure balance stems from exploration or production, the 
corresponding additional allowances for capital expenditure incurred under the Tenth 
Schedule should be granted.  Whilst this interpretation may be viewed as aggressive 
by the revenue authorities, this interpretation is supported by the wording of the 





Those OPASA members that favour this interpretation requested that National 
Treasury should draft retrospective legislation to confirm that this treatment in respect 
of the balance of unredeemed capital expenditure is correct and is applicable to OP26 
lessees who held former prospecting and mining OP26 leases and sub-leases. 
 
The OPASA members proposed that sub-paragraph 5(1) of the Tenth Schedule should 
be amended as follows (Futter, 2010:A6-8): 
 
“5(1) For purposes of determining the taxable income of an oil and gas 
company in the first year of assessment commencing after the inception of this 
schedule, there shall be allowed as a deduction the balance of the unredeemed 
capital expenditure, as defined, by holders of the former OP26 prospecting 
and mining leases, and furthermore during any year of assessment, there will 
be allowed as a deduction from the oil and gas income of that company all 
expenditure and losses actually incurred (other than any expenditure or loss 
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actually incurred in respect of the acquisition of any oil and gas right, except 
as allowed in paragraph 7(3)) in that year in respect of exploration or 
production. 
 
5(2) In addition to any other deductions (as contemplated in subparagraph (1) 
other than any expenditure or loss actually incurred in respect of the 
acquisition of any oil and gas right) allowable in terms of this paragraph, for 
purposes of determining the taxable income of an oil and gas company during 
any year of assessment, there will be allowed as deductions from the oil or gas 
income of that company derived in that year –  
a) 100 per cent of all expenditure of a capital nature actually incurred in that 
year in respect of exploration in terms of an oil and gas right, including, in 
the first year of assessment commencing after the inception of this 
Schedule, the balance of unredeemed capital expenditure carried forward 
and deducted under paragraph 5(1); and 
b) 50 per cent of all expenditure of a capital nature actually incurred in that 
year in respect of production in terms of an oil and gas right, including, in 
the first year of assessment commencing after the inception of this 
Schedule, the balance of unredeemed capital expenditure carried forward 
and deducted under paragraph 5(1).” 
 
Furthermore, it was suggested that a definition of “unredeemed capital expenditure” 
be inserted which replicates the provisions of clause 23.7.2 of the sub-lease 
agreements as follows: 
 
“ ‘unredeemed capital expenditure’ means - 
(a) the costs of laying pipelines from the mining block to the points[…] 
(b) the costs expended by the OP26  lessee on prospecting operations within the 
area covered by the mining block in any tax year or part thereof prior to the 
date of granting of the Mining Lease; 
(c) the costs incurred by the OP26 lessee in connection with the viability of the 
relevant undertaking and the design, procurement, management (including 
also project management), transport and construction of the constituent parts 















foundations) of any marine or onshore receiving installations erected or to be 
erected on the mining block or onshore with a view to exploitation of the 
natural oil discovered or found in the mining block, including also the costs of 
training of personnel for any purpose in connection with such installations, at 
any time prior to the successful commissioning of such installations but 
excluding any assets belonging to another taxpayer; and 
(d) a capital allowance equal to 12% (twelve per cent) compound interest per 
annum on the total amount of unredeemed capital expenditure, ranking for 
redemption, calculated from the end of the month during which such cost was 
incurred, until it be redeemed and calculated, as far as this can be done 
according to the provisions of section 26(3) and (4) of the Mining Rights Act, 
1967, an example of which is attached hereto as Annexure 1.” 
 
In addition, the following amendment was proposed: 
 
Paragraph 5(1A)(1) which  should read as follows: “Unredeemed capital 
expenditure as defined, will be deemed to be incurred by holders of the former 
OP26 prospecting and mining leases and sub-leases, under the provisions of 
section 36(7E), in the first year of assessment commencing after the inception 
of this Schedule.” 
 
This suggested wording clarifies that the correct treatment of the balance of the 
unredeemed capital expenditure is a deduction in full in the first year of applying the 
Tenth Schedule, as well as confirming that a 100% or 50% uplift in respect of this 
amount in the same year is applicable. 
 
A further interpretation is that not unlike depreciation under section 11(e) or 
accelerated depreciation under section 12C, the sections applied are those in existence 
at the date of acquisition of the capital asset and any subsequent change to the section 
would only apply in respect of capital assets acquired on or after the inception of the 
new provisions. The old capital assets in such circumstances, unless specifically 
provided for in the amendment to the section, continue until the capital asset is fully 















interpretation, there is case law relating to labour law and amendments to labour 
legislation that reflect this principle. 
 
 “There is a strong presumption in South African Law that legislation is not 




 “[…] it is presumed that the legislature did not intend to interfere with 
existing law and ‘a fortiori’, not to deprive parties of existing remedies for 
wrongs done to them. ‘A statute will be construed as doing so only if it 
appears expressly or by necessary implication […]’ The same is true of the 




However, where new legislation or an amendment to existing legislation is 
ambiguous, or the legislative amendments are unjust or inequitable,
126
 and deprive a 
person from existing rights and liberties, Tickle & Lombaard (2010:2) argue that such 





The Tenth Schedule only applies to expenditure incurred in the taxpayer’s first year of 
assessment commencing on or after 2 November 2006. It follows, therefore that 
expenditure incurred prior to the inception of the Tenth Schedule would remain 
subject to the “old legislation”
128
 (Tickle & Lombard, 2010:2). Thus, it may be 
possible to argue that the 12% annual capital expenditure allowance which applies to 
capital expenditure incurred prior to the inception of the Tenth Schedule, which arose 
consequent upon section 36(11)(c) of the Income Tax Act as at 1977, read with the 
OP26 mining lease, should still apply to capital expenditure unredeemed, until the 
expenditure has been redeemed. The author shares this interpretation. 
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However, existing investors who favour this interpretation remain justifiably 
concerned about the correct interpretation with regard to the continuation of the 
unredeemed capital expenditure allowance. To obtain absolute certainty they 
proposed the following new paragraph to the Tenth Schedule in a submission to 
National Treasury (Futter, 2009:A3): 
 
“The proposed wording of a new paragraph to the Tenth Schedule (as drawn from the 
wording of section 36(11) of the Income Tax Act) reads: 
 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE INCURRED PRIOR TO THIS SCHEDULE’S 
INCEPTION 
 
9. (1) There shall be allowed to be deducted from the oil and gas income 
derived by the taxpayer from the exploitation of the oil and gas right, a capital 
allowance calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the amount of 
the unredeemed balance of exploration and production expenditure of a 
capital nature incurred prior to the inception of this schedule. 
 
(2) The unredeemed balance shall be determined by the deduction from the 
aggregate of capital expenditure referred to in sub paragraph (1) at the end of 
every year of assessment- 
 
 (a) of the taxable income derived from the production of such oil and  
       gas right in that year, as determined before the deduction of any 
       amount allowable under paragraph 5(2) in relation to such oil and  
gas right and before the set-off in terms of 5(3) and 5(4) of any 
balance  of assessed loss which is attributable to any deduction 
made under paragraph 5(2) in relation to such oil and gas right ;  
       and 
(b)  the sum of the amounts received or accrued in that year from the 
disposal of assets contemplated in paragraph 7 held prior to the 
















This suggested wording allows the OP26 unredeemed capital allowance, calculated at 
12% on a diminishing unredeemed capital expenditure balance only, in respect of 
capital expenditure incurred prior to the inception of the Tenth Schedule. This 
unredeemed capital expenditure balance is reduced each year by oil and gas income 
and the proceeds on the disposal of an oil and gas right held prior to the inception of 
the Tenth Schedule. 
 




A farm-in / farm-out involves a situation where the owner (the “farmor”) transfers a 
portion of its interest in a mining block to another party (the “farmee”) in exchange 
for a work commitment, for example, the farmee may agree to undertake exploration, 
development or drill a well(s). Farm-in / farm-out arrangements may take any number 
of forms. In some instances, the entire interest in a mining block is transferred to the 
farmee, and the farmor retains an overriding royalty on the mining block’s production. 
Another possibility is that the farmor transfers the interest to the farmee and retains a 
reversionary interest in the overriding royalty. That is, the overriding royalty reverts 
back to an interest in the mining block when the farmee’s net profits from the mining 
block’s production have been sufficient to enable the farmee to recoup its exploration 
and drilling costs. In the event that the exploration and/or drilling is unsuccessful, the 
farmor is under no obligation to reimburse the farmee.   
 
The Tenth Schedule provides special rules for Capital Gains Tax purposes relating to 
the disposal of oil and gas rights at any stage of the exploration and production 
process and refers to the “rollover treatment” and the “participation treatment”, either 
of which can be elected by the company disposing of the right. But the Tenth 
Schedule does not provide for the transfer of fiscal stability
129
 from the farmor to 
farmee of the production rights (refer to 4.2 of this dissertation). 
                                                 
129
 The “rollover treatment” and the “participation treatment” are limited to the proceeds directly 
















4.5.2 Taxation of farm-in/farm-out proceeds/expense under the OP26 regime 
 
A taxpayer that prospects with the intention of exploiting (“mining”) the mineral right 
itself, is regarded as a miner. If a taxpayer has acquired a mineral right for the purpose 
of making a gain by selling the mineral right in a scheme of profit making,
130
 the 
taxpayer would be regarded as a speculator. It is emphasised that the classification is 
not a matter of election, but is a consequence of the taxpayer’s conduct in relation to 
its interest.
131




A miner is taxed according to the general tax principles subject to the mining tax 
rules. A speculator is taxed on the general tax principles only.  
 
4.5.2.1 OP26 regime 
 
Clegg (2006:12) states that section 11(b) of the Income Tax Act as at 1977 provided 
for the deduction of non-capital expenditure incurred outside the Republic. Thus 
where the new participant is a speculator, the expenditure would be, subject to the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue, deductible under section 11(b); on the other hand 
where the new participant is a miner/investor, the expenditure would not be tax 
deductible, although much may depend upon the exact wording
133
 of the farm-in 
agreement.   
 
The proceeds from a farm-out by the speculator would be taxable, whereas in the case 
of a miner should not be taxable (refer to 3.4.1 of this dissertation for the reasons why 
CGT should not be applicable). Note that the determination whether the proceeds 
from the disposal are on revenue or capital account in the context of oil and gas 
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prospecting and mining is often difficult in practice ( and probably more so than  in 
the case of hard rock mines where JV operations are not the industry norm) (Clegg, 
2006:12). 
 
4.5.2.2 Current Income Tax Act 
 
Clegg (2006:12) indicates that a speculator would claim a tax deduction under section 
11(a) of the current Income Tax Act, and the costs expended by a miner would, 
subject to paragraph 20 of the Eighth Schedule, increase the “base cost” of the asset 
for CGT purposes. 
 
The net proceeds/taxable income from a farm-out or other disposal by a speculator 
would be taxable (at income tax rates), whereas in the case of a miner would be 
subject to CGT. 
 
4.5.3 Taxation of the disposal of an oil and gas right under the Tenth Schedule 
regime  
 
Clegg and Steenkamp (2007:4) indicate that it is important to determine whether the 
consideration received from the disposal of a right will be income or capital in nature. 
As a general rule, if an asset (such as an oil and gas right) was held with the dominant 
purpose of producing production revenues, income derived from the disposal of the 
right would be of a capital nature, and subject to CGT. If the asset was acquired with 
the dominant purpose of disposing of it to another oil and gas company, consideration 
derived from its disposal would be for gross income and taxed as such. The nature of 
the industry has led to a practical situation in which relatively few mining blocks (and 
therefore producing wells) worldwide are held exclusively by one company. 
Frequently, in order to spread both the high risk of drilling a “dry well” and the 
consequentially immense costs of exploration and development, the practice has 
developed of even the major players “farming-out” shares in their oil properties to 
other participants. Consequently, the question whether such a sale is on capital or 
revenue account is likely to arise. And in some cases, where the participant is a small 















appear at first sight that such participant is “trading” in oil rights. The better view is 
probably that in the vast majority of cases, the original holder of the right acquired it 
with the dominant intention of holding it in order to prospect and produce oil reserves 
from that part which the holder could afford to retain and finance. The fact that the 
holder knows on acquisition that it will farm-out substantial undivided shares in the 
property to other participants should not affect the issue, since the acquisition of the 





Previously, where the oil and gas company derived capital gains in the case of a 
disposal of an oil and gas right (which was held as a capital asset), such capital gain 
would likely be considered to be “derived by it from prospecting for Natural Oil and 
transactions in connection therewith”,
135
 and therefore be covered by the OP26 
regime. The capital gain would thus not be subject to CGT, as CGT was not part of 
the Income Tax Act as at 1977. The term “transactions in connection therewith”  in 
this context would probably be given a wide interpretation, to include, for example, 
the disposal or “farm-out” of a share in an oil and gas field. 
 
Special rules apply to disposals of oil and gas rights by oil and gas companies. In 
addition to the basic rules provided elsewhere in the Income Tax Act, the Tenth 
Schedule contains two elections. The oil and gas company disposing of any oil and 
gas right to another company may elect to have either rollover treatment or 
participation treatment.  
 
The effect of the rollover treatment is that the selling oil and gas company is deemed 
to have disposed of an oil and gas right for an amount equal to the tax cost of the right 
disposed, regardless of whether that right is capital asset or trading stock, eliminating 
all capital or ordinary gain upon disposal for the seller. 
 
The effect of the participation treatment is that the selling oil and gas company treats 
all gains on the disposal of an oil and gas right as ordinary revenue, regardless of 
whether that right is capital or trading stock, resulting in a an immediate deduction for 
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the acquiring company equal to the deemed ordinary revenue gain included by the 
selling company. 
 
Because of the elections that are available to the disposing company, the intention of 
the disposing company is no longer relevant in determining whether the disposal of 
the oil and gas is on capital or revenue account. The implication is that “miners” and 
“speculators” alike have the same elections available and tax treatment. 
 
Accordingly, a speculator in oil and gas rights can realise a profit on the disposal of 
an oil and gas right tax free under the rollover treatment. This is clearly a more 
favourable tax treatment under the Tenth Schedule than under the OP26 regime for a 
speculator.   
 
Furthermore, in contrast to the mining rules there are no recoupment
136
 provisions in 
relation to the capital expenditure and the additional capital allowances provided for 
under paragraph 5 of the Tenth Schedule in respect of the disposal of mining 
equipment and assets. This too is a more favourable tax treatment under the Tenth 
Schedule than under the OP26 regime for miners and speculators alike.   
 
4.5.4 Interpretational issues 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2006 provides 
that an oil and gas company disposing of its oil and gas right in a profit situation (i.e. 
market value/selling price is greater than base cost/cost of the oil and gas right) is able 
to choose one of three methods to calculate the income tax consequences on disposal. 
Loss assets (i.e. those with a tax cost in excess of market value) simply trigger losses 
upon disposal as allowed elsewhere in the Income Tax Act.    
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The example furnished in the Explanatory Memorandum (2006:22) is as follows: 
Facts.  
Company X, an oil and gas company, holds multiple oil and gas rights off the South 
African coast, including a Block A offshore right. Company X acquired the off-shore 
right for 30 million U.S. dollars and that right is worth 100 million U.S. dollars as of 
15 July 2008. Company X has 400 million U.S. dollars in excess oil and gas losses. 
Company X has agreed to sell the Block A offshore right for 100 million U.S. dollars 
in cash to Company Y, another oil and gas company. Assume Company X held the oil 
and gas right as a capital asset before the sale.  
 
Result.  
Both Company X and Company Y have three choices:  
(i) If no election is made, basic capital gains tax principles apply. Under this scenario, 
Company X has 70 million U.S. dollars of capital gain (100 million – 30 million). 
Company Y meanwhile obtains a 100 million U.S. dollar base cost in the oil and 
gas right acquired.  
(ii) If a rollover election is made, the sale does not trigger any capital gains tax for 
Company X. Company Y obtains a 30 million U.S. dollar base cost in the oil and 
gas right acquired.  
(iii) If a participation election i  made, Company X has ordinary revenue equal to 70 
million U.S. dollars (which will be offset by the 400 million U.S. dollars of 
excess losses). Company Y obtains a 70 million U.S. dollar immediate deduction 
and obtains a 30 million U.S. dollar amount as the tax cost in the oil and gas right 
acquired. 
The wording of the Tenth Schedule at paragraph 7 does not specifically provide for 
three options available to the disposing company with regard to the tax treatment of 
the proceeds on disposal of an oil and gas right. Existing investors in the oil and gas 
sector are concerned that the revenue authorities may interpret the provisions of sub-
paragraphs 7(2) and 7(3) as being exhaustive and that the tax consequences on 
disposal of an oil and gas right are to be calculated in terms of one of the two 















Clegg & Van Riel (2010:2) indicate that an amendment to the Tenth Schedule would 
be important for oil and gas companies who may need to consider which provisions of 
the Act to apply in calculating the tax consequences of a business decision to sell off 
all or part of an oil and gas right. 
Further, the elections provided for in the Tenth Schedule bind not only the disposing 
company, but also the acquiring company; potentially leading to a treatment that is 
undesirable to the acquiring company. Allowing the normal provisions of the Act to 
provide for further alternative(s) would promote flexibility and serve to encourage 
new or extended participation in the industry (Clegg & Van Riel, 2010:2). 
OPASA, to avoid ambiguity in interpreting paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, has 
proposed the following amendment in a submission to National Treasury (Clegg & 
Van Riel, 2010:3): 
“Sub-paragraph 7(1) of the Tenth Schedule should be substituted with the following 
sub-paragraph: 
(7)(1)(i) If any oil and gas company disposes of any oil and gas right to 
another company, that oil and gas company may elect that, 
notwithstanding any provisions of this Act to the contrary, income tax 
consequences of that disposal be determined in terms of the rollover 
treatment as contemplated in sub-paragraph (2) or the participation 
treatment as contemplated in sub-paragraph (3). 
   (1)(ii) The election contemplated in sub-paragraph 7(1)(i) must be in the 
form and manner to be determined by the Commissioner. 
  (1)(iii) If no election is made as contemplated in sub-paragraph 7(1)(i), the 
remaining provisions of this Act shall apply.” 
The suggested wording clarifies that an oil and gas company may effectively choose 
whether they wish to have the income tax consequences of the disposal of an oil and 
gas right determined in the “normal” provision of the Act (including the Eighth 




















The aim of the Legislature was to renew the core aspects of the OP26 regime in order 
to retain the existing investors, whilst allowing lesser aspects to fall away.
137
 It is 
submitted that the Tenth Schedule fails to achieve this stated aim.  
 
Arguably, the core aspect of the OP26 regime was the ability to “freeze” the tax 
benefits in the Income Tax Act at a specified date. In this chapter, it is identified that 
the Tenth Schedule provides for a fiscal guarantee as opposed to genuine fiscal 
stability, and furthermore that there is no transfer of a fiscal stability agreement in 
relation to a production right.  Additional investor concerns examined in chapter 4 
were: ring-fencing in the context of what constitutes oil and gas income or income 
derived from the refining of gas; the deduction of allowances in relation to capital 
expenditure incurred prior to the inception of the Tenth Schedule; and the tax 
treatment of the disposal of an oil and gas right. These investor concerns emanate 
from the taxation of a benefit or limitation of a deduction in accordance with the 
provisions of the Tenth Schedule that would not have existed under the OP26 regime 
by virtue of the tax treatment under the Income Tax Act at a specified date.  
Ironically, as depicted in chapter 3, it would appear to be the lesser aspects, namely 
ancillary legislation (such as VAT, customs and excise), the corporate income tax 
rates (consistent with the corporate income tax rate applicable to all companies in 
South Africa) and the full deduction of operating and mining expenses (consistent 
with the mining tax provisions as contained in section 15 and 36 of the Income Tax 
Act) that were preserved by the Tenth Schedule. 
 
This chapter highlights the interpretational issues and proposed possible amendments 
to the Tenth Schedule that have been submitted by the oil and gas industry to National 
Treasury to clarify the application of the Tenth Schedule. In the absence of the 
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acceptance and enactment of these amendments, the author would anticipate that the 
SARS may release interpretation notes offering guidance to oil and gas companies. 
Whilst case law would indicate that such interpretation notes have no legal standing 
or legal precedence, the interpretation notes would still provide valuable guidance and 
authority as to the SARS’ opinion regarding the interpretation and application of the 


















CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Context  
 
Prior to 2 November 2006, the taxation of the exploration for and production of Oil 
and Gas in South Africa was contained in a myriad of OP26 prospecting, OP26 
mining and OP26 sublease agreements (collectively known as the “OP26 regime”). 
The specifics of the OP26 regime, given the secrecy surrounding South African oil 
exploration during the apartheid era and the highly specialised nature of the industry, 
were largely unknown to the revenue authorities and tax practitioners, other than 
those closely involved in the industry (Clegg & Steenkamp, 2007: 1). 
 
The OP26 was a favourable tax dispensation (given South Africa’s poor geological 
attractiveness) aimed at attracting and retaining investors in South Africa’s upstream 
oil and gas industry. The OP26 regime effectively “froze” the taxation of oil and gas 
companies in accordance with the Income Tax Act as at 1977 (and as such protected 
OP26 taxpayers from new legislation such as the ring-fencing of mining assessed 
losses, transfer pricing, thin-capitalisation and CGT whilst furthermore allowing the 
flexibility to choose between tax deductions available under the current Income Tax 
Act and those of the Income Tax Act as at 1977). An inherent weakness of the OP26 
regime (at least in the eyes of the revenue authorities) was that it lacked 
standardisation and transparency (in that the terminology used in the OP26 lease 
agreements and the provisions of the OP26 lease agreements differed from one OP26 
lease to another).  
In 2002 the Mineral Petroleum Resources Development Act
138
 (“MPDRA”) was 
enacted. The MPRDA vests all mineral rights in the state. The MPRDA has a number 
of objectives, including to: 
 promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources 
to all the people of South Africa;  
 substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons, including women, to enter the mineral and 
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petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation’s 
mineral and petroleum resources;  
 promote economic growth and mineral and petroleum resources 
development in the country;  
 provide for security of tenure in respect of prospecting, exploration, 
mining and production operations;  
 give effect to section 24
139
 of the Constitution by ensuring that the 
nation’s mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and 
ecologically sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and 
economic development; and  
 ensure that holders of mining and production rights contribute towards 
the socio-economic development of the areas in which they are operating. 
 
A consequence of the MPRDA was that the existing OP26 prospecting, OP26 mining 
leases and OP26 sublease agreements would either expire on 30 June 2007, or were to 
be converted to MPRDA exploration and MPRDA production rights respectively. 
 
To fill the void created by the demise of the OP26 regime, the Legislature engaged the 
upstream oil and gas industry.  Following a period of lengthy engagement, the 
Legislature drafted and promulgated the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. The 
aim of the Tenth Schedule was to bring the taxation of oil and gas companies into the 
legislative framework of the Income Tax Act, providing for standardisation and 
transparency. Furthermore, the Legislature sought to retain the existing oil and gas 
investors (through preservation of the tax benefits that attracted them to South 
Africa).  
 
5.2 Summary of findings 
 
Chapter 2 provides the background of the OP26 regime and the Tenth Schedule 
regime. The author critically compared transparency and standardisation in relation to 
the OP26 regime to the Tenth Schedule regime. The author examined the purpose of 
transparency and standardisation in relation to anti-avoidance and consistent 
                                                 
139
 This states that everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-















interpretation. Chapter 2 concluded that the Tenth Schedule does not in all 
circumstances afford greater transparency and standardisation particularly in relation 
to fiscal stability agreements. 
 
Chapter 3 critically compares the OP26 regime to the tax treatment under the Tenth 
Schedule to identify their similarities. It is concluded that whilst there are similarities 
(such as tax rates, STC, VAT, customs duties, the deduction of operating expenses, 
the deduction of exploration and production expenses) between the tax benefits 
offered to oil and gas companies under the OP26 regime and the Tenth Schedule, it 
may be stated that companies engaged in the exploration for and production of oil and 
gas do not enjoy the same, if not more favourable, tax dispensation under the Tenth 
Schedule than under the OP26 regime. In fact, provisions such as the ring-fencing of 
oil and gas losses, CGT, thin capitalisation and transfer pricing are unfavourable in 
comparison to the OP26 regime. 
 
Chapter 4 provides analysis of the primary concerns of existing investors in the 
upstream oil and gas sector in relation to the taxation of the exploration for and 
production of oil and gas in South Africa. The interpretational issues (such as defining 
the meaning of “oil and gas income”, the correct treatment of “unredeemed capital 
expenditure” incurred prior to the inception of the Tenth Schedule and the tax 
treatment on disposal of an oil and gas right) were discussed. It is submitted that 
possible amendments to the Tenth Schedule may be required. Chapter 4 concluded 
that not all of the core aspects of the OP26 regime have been fully preserved by the 
Tenth Schedule, specifically Fiscal Stability and the ability to transfer a fiscal stability 
agreement in relation to a production right.   
 
5.3 Envisaged interventions by the revenue authorities 
    
The Tenth Schedule may be regarded as transitional legislation, in that it continues to 
evolve correspondent to the interpretational and practical difficulties identified by its 
stakeholders (namely the upstream oil and gas industry and government) over time. 
This metamorphosis is ascribed to the fact that the Tenth Schedule is unique from the 















any other established dispensation (as in the case of South Africa’s VAT, CGT, anti-
avoidance or transfer pricing legislation).  Nonetheless, whilst the author has 
proposed possible amendments to the Tenth Schedule in chapter 4 of this dissertation, 
it should be noted that National Treasury are reluctant to make changes to the 
legislation that they construe as unnecessary in relation to the legislation’s intended 
application or that frivolously entertain only academic argument.  The amendments 
likely to be dealt with by National Treasury are limited to those within National 
Treasury’s mandate, namely amendments linked to “fiscal policy”.  
 
It is the practise of the administrators of the tax legislation (namely the SARS) upon 
the introduction of new legislation in respect of which there may be administrative 
compliance or interpretational difficulties to periodically publish guidance to the 
taxpayer. Examples are the SARS Public Benefit Organisations (“PBO”) guide (3
rd
 













in relation to PBO’s that fall within the ambit of the Ninth Schedule to the Income 
Tax Act. SARS also issued a Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains Tax (Issue 3, 
May 2010) and The ABC of capital gains tax for companies (Issue 4, June 2008) in an 
attempt to improve the taxpayers understanding of the Eighth Schedule to the Income 
Tax Act. The author accordingly expects that the intervention and corrective action 
taken by the revenue authorities to be similar publications from SARS in relation to 
the Tenth Schedule.   
 
It is submitted that the publication of practise notes, interpretation notes and 
guidelines, although beneficial for the guidance that they offer, would be 
unsatisfactory to existing investors in the upstream oil and gas industry. Such 
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publications have no legal standing or legal precedence and accordingly do not 
provide the same assurance an amendment to the tax legislation. 
 
5.4 The benefit of this research 
  
This dissertation describes the development of the taxation of oil and gas companies 
under the OP26 regime to the Tenth Schedule regime. This should benefit oil and gas 
companies (existing and potential new investors) and the revenue authorities 
(National Treasury and the SARS) through collation of the applicable legislation, case 
law, commentary and interpretational difficulties into one body of work. The author 
aimed to gain and demonstrate a knowledge base in respect of the taxation of the 
offshore exploration for and production of oil and gas in South Africa and to 
contribute toward the academic discussion of the Tenth Schedule. 
 
5.5 Suggestions for future research 
 
The author does not perceive that this dissertation is exhaustive in responding to all 
the concerns of stakeholders in the South African upstream oil and gas industry.  
  
Omar (1998:2) states that the income tax rate is one of the most important factors 
determining investment in hydrocarbon production and should be appropriately set to 
attract the necessary foreign investment. The scope of this dissertation is limited to the 
taxation of the offshore exploration for and production of oil and gas in South Africa. 
As such this dissertation cannot answer the question: “Is the Tenth Schedule 
appropriate to attracting and retaining investors?” To determine whether the Tenth 
Schedule is attractive to investors would require a study to be conducted of the fiscal 
regimes offered by competing countries with similar geologies.  
 
To ensure that the state as resource-owner receives an appropriate share of the 
economic rent generated from extraction of oil and gas, the fiscal regime must be 
appropriately designed. Oil and gas agreements and the associated fiscal rules 
establish the “price” of the resource in terms of the bonuses, royalties, taxes or other 















et al., 2001:1). This dissertation considers only the corporate income taxation of oil 
and gas companies. It does not consider the economic rent received by government on 
the extraction of oil and gas holistically. To evaluate whether or not such economic 
rent is appropriately priced, a detailed study of all the taxes (including specifically 




















Table 1. OP26 Prospecting Lease v OP26 Mining Lease 
OP26 PROSPECTING LEASE OP26 MINING LEASE 
1. The OP26 prospecting leases and 
OP26 prospecting sub-leases are 
taxed in terms of the Income Tax Act 
as at 1977, or as specifically 
determined under the prospecting or 
mining sub-lease. Accordingly the 
deduction of a capital allowance of 
12% on the unredeemed portion of 
capital expenditure under the current 
Income Tax Act would be restricted 
to only 6% under the Income Tax Act 
as at 1977. 
 
1. Under the OP26 mining lease, the 
original lessee can elect the better of 
the deductions in the Income Tax Act 
as at 1977 or the current Income Tax 
Act. This elective provision allows 
the OP26 mining lessee to claim 
deductions in respect of one mine 
against the mining income of another 
mine or even its taxable income from 
non-mining operations that would 
have been ring-fenced under the 
current Income Tax Act.  
 
2. The OP26 prospecting lease or the 
OP26 prospecting sub-lease 
agreements do not have a  special 
incentive for taxable income derived 
from the disposal of natural oil. 
 
2. The OP26 mining lease provides a 
special incentive reduction of tax at 
clause 23.10, “an amount equal to 
50% of so much of such tax as is 
relatable to taxable income derived 
from the disposal of natural oil from 
the mining block”. 
 
3. The OP26 prospecting lease and the 
mining sub-lease agreements do not 
give the Minister any discretion (in 
consultation with the Minister of 
Finance) to reduce the tax charge. 
 
3. The OP26 mining lease contains a 
specific provision at clause 23.11 that 
“the amount of tax payable… shall be 
reduced to or by such an amount and 
subject to the provisions as the 















consultation with the Minister of 
Finance, may determine”. 
 
 
4. Under the OP26 prospecting lease 
and the OP26 prospecting sub-lease 
agreements the tax rate is capped at a 
specified maximum as provided for in 
the relevant OP26 prospecting lease 
or OP26 prospecting sub-lease 
agreement 
4. The tax rate for mining companies in 
OP26 mining lease is limited to a 
maximum of the current rate (i.e. 
28%) 
5. The OP26 prospecting lease and 
OP26 prospecting sub-lease does not 
contain an express exemption for 
STC (the terms being drafted prior to 
the introduction of STC) 
5. The OP26 mining sub-leases 
specifically exempt the lessee from 
Secondary Tax on Companies 

















Table 2. Similarities between the OP26 regime and the Tenth Schedule regime 
OP 26 REGIME TENTH SCHEDULE REGIME 
1. Tax rate = 28% 1. Tax rate = 28% and 31% for 
foreign companies. 
2. No STC in terms of OP26 mining 
lease. 
2. STC at 0% on dividends declared 
from OP26 right. 
3. No CGT 3. CGT on the disposal of assets. 
Rollover relief election provided 
for in relation to the disposal of 
oil and gas rights. 
4. No ring-fencing per mine nor 
industry 
4. No ring-fencing per mine. Ring-
fencing in relation to the set-off of 
oil and gas losses against non-oil 
and gas income. 
5. Unrealised foreign exchange 
gains and losses excluded. 
5. Unrealised foreign exchange 
gains and losses included. 
6. No customs duties on the import 
of equipment and machinery 
required for mining operations. 
6. No customs duties on the import 
of equipment and machinery 
required for mining operations. 
7. VAT applies 7. VAT applies 
8. Operating expenses fully 
deductible 
8. Operating expenses fully 
deductible 
9. Capital  (prospecting and mining ) 
expenses fully deductible 
9. Capital (exploration and 
production) expenses fully 
deductible. 
10.  No thin capitalisation or transfer 
pricing 
10.  “Safe harbour” for thin 
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THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN ITS 






























The Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1962, (“the Schedule”) with effect as of 
the date of this agreement provides that: 
The Minister may enter into an agreement that contractually binds the State 
with any oil and gas company guaranteeing that the provisions of the Schedule 
as at the date the agreement is entered into will apply in respect of the 
company’s oil and gas right or in anticipation of that company acquiring an oil 
and gas right. 
AND X is an oil and gas company that currently holds what is referred to as an 
“old order” right in Block Y in terms of an OP26 Prospecting Sub-Lease 
Agreement (“PSLA”), acquired pursuant to a purchase and sale agreement 
with Z and ceded to X.  It is further anticipated that the OP26 PSLA will be 
converted into an exploration right granted in accordance with the terms and 
provisions of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, Act 28 
of 2002 (“MPRDA”).   
NOW THEREFORE THE MINISTER AND X AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1. This fiscal stability agreement is conditional upon an exploration right being 
granted to X in accordance with the terms and provisions of the MPRDA.   
2. It is guaranteed that the provisions of the Schedule as at the date this agreement 
is entered into will apply to Xs’ exploration right in Y, as long as the right is 
held by X. For purposes of this agreement, a right includes the renewal of 
exploration rights and initial production right converted from an exploration 
right with all these rights being treated as one and the same. 
3. X is incorporated in the Republic and accordingly is a resident and; therefore, 
the rate of tax referred to in paragraph 2(1)(a), read together with paragraph 
2(2), of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 as at the date that 















4. X will be subject to secondary tax on companies as envisaged in paragraph 
3(3).. 
5. In relation to the current exploration right or renewal thereof held in Y: 
5.1 In the case of a disposal of the right to any other oil and gas company, X may 
assign all of its fiscal stability rights in terms of this agreement to any company. 
6. In relation to the production right converted from an exploration right held in Y:  
6.1 The terms and conditions of this agreement will apply to all participating 
interests subsequently held by X in such rights. 
6.2 In the case of a disposal of such right, X may assign all of its fiscal stability 
rights in terms of this agreement to any other oil and gas company if at the time 
of the conclusion of this agreement the other company is a company within the 
same “group of companies” (as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act No 
58 of 1962) as X. 
7. X may at any time unilaterally terminate the application of this agreement in 
respect of the right held in Y, with effect from the commencement of the year of 
assessment immediately following the notification date of termination. 
8. The portion of taxable income and profits of X derived from all oil and gas 
rights governed by the Schedule in effect on the date of this agreement must be 
determined in aggregate in terms of the Schedule. 
9. Failure to apply this agreement for the benefit of X which has a material adverse 
economic impact on the taxation of income or profits of X, entitles X to: 
9.1 Compensation for the loss of market value caused by such failure; or 
9.2  An alternative remedy that otherwise eliminates the impact of the failure. 
 



















being duly authorised hereto.   
 
_______________________ 
The Government of the Republic of 
South Africa in its National 
Treasury represented by the 
Minister of Finance. 
 
















ANNEXURE C  
 
Illustration of the impact of the Tenth Schedule elections 
 
The participation and rollover elections in the Tenth Schedule allow the disposing 
company alternatives when evaluating whether or not to farm-out to an acquiring 
company. Furthermore, these elections give the disposing company negotiating power 
in determining the sale price based on the tax treatment of the proceeds.  
 
In this illustration, the author will examine four scenarios from their tax perspective in 
relation to a proposed farm-out of a South African exploration right: 
 
 Company A (“existing right holder”) does not farm-out and incurs all capital 
expenditure on exploration, 
 The Company B (“Farmee”) pays for percentage participation and shares in 
capital expenditure on exploration in accordance with that percentage. 
 Company B pays for its percentage participation and furthermore carries 
Company A in terms of the exploration work programme. 
 Company A incurs all the capital expenditure on exploration and then disposes 
of 50% of the South African exploration right. 
 
Illustration of - Scenario 1 
In this scenario, Company A does not farm-out. Company A incurs capital 
expenditure of R120mil on exploration.  
 
Tax effect – 
  Tax deduction of  R120mil (exploration capital expenditure) 
 Plus  Tax uplift of 100% R120mil 
  Total tax deduction R240mil 
 
Impact – Company A incurs R120mil in costs but enjoys the R240mil deduction from 

















Illustration of – Scenario 2 
Company B pays R100mil for a 50% participation in the South African exploration 
right. The costs of exploration capital expenditure will be shared in the same 
proportion with Company A. 
 
A. Tax effect – Roll-over treatment 
  R100mil          - no tax as deemed to be sold for tax value 
 
Impact – Company A receives R100 tax fee 
 
  Tax deduction of  R60mil (50% of capital expenditure) 
 Plus Tax uplift of  100%  R60mil 
  Total tax deduction  R120mil 
 
Impact – Company A has utilised the proceeds received from Company B to finance 
its proportionate share of the exploration capital expenditure. Company A will enjoy 
the R120mil deduction from its taxable income. Therefore Company A has sheltered 
R120mil from tax (R33,6mil). 
 
Company B has no tax deduction for the funds paid for participation in the South 
African exploration right. Furthermore, Company B inherits its base cost from 
Company A for CGT purposes. Namely, Company B will not receive any CGT 
benefit  for the funds paid.  
 
Company B incurs a further R60mil exploration capital costs but enjoys the R120mil 
deduction from taxable income. Company B has deferred its tax liability until the 
R120mil is set-off against future taxable income, reducing such taxable income and 
accordingly saving tax on R120mil (R33,6mil). 
 
















  R100mil     - treated as taxable income 
 
  Tax deduction of  R60mil (50% of capital expenditure) 
 Plus Tax uplift of  100%  R60mil 
  Total tax deduction  R120mil 
 
Impact – Company A has utilised funds from Company B to finance its proportionate 
share of the exploration capital expenditure. Company A includes the funds from 
Company B in its taxable income. Company A enjoys a deduction of R120mil from 
its taxable income. Therefore, Company A has sheltered R20mil (namely R100mil- 
R120mil) from tax (R5,6mil). 
 
Company B will have a tax deduction for the R100mil funds paid for its participation. 
Company B incurs a further R60mil in exploration capital costs but will enjoy a 
deduction of R120mil from its taxable income. Company B therefore has deferred its 
tax liability until the R220mil (R100mil plus R120mil) is set-off against future taxable 
income, reducing such income and accordingly saving tax on R220mil (R61,6mil). 
 
Illustration of – Scenario 3 
Company B pays R40mil for a 50% participation in the South African exploration 
right. Company B carries Company A in respect of the cost of exploration capital 
expenditure. 
 
A. Tax effect – Roll-over treatment 
  R40mil          - no tax as deemed to be sold for tax value 
 
Impact – Company A receives R40mil tax free. 
 
Company B has no tax deduction for the funds that it paid for participation in the 
South African exploration right. Furthermore Company B will inherit its base cost 
from Company A for CGT purposes. Company B has not received any CGT benefit 

















Company B incurs a further R120mil capital exploration cost but enjoys the R240mil 
deduction from its taxable income. Company B therefore defers its tax liability until 
the R240mil is set-off against future taxable income reducing such income and 
accordingly saving tax on R240mil (R67,2mil tax). 
 
 
B. Tax effect – Participation treatment 
 
  R40mil     - treated as taxable income 
 
Impact – Company A includes the R40mil received from Company B in its taxable 
income. Therefore Company A pays additional tax on R40mil (R11,2mil). 
 
Company B has a tax deduction for the R40mil that it paid for participation in the 
South African exploration right. Company B incurs a further R120mil exploration 
capital cost but will enjoys the R240mil deduction from its taxable income. Company 
B therefore defers its tax liability until the R280mil (R40mil plus R240mil) is set-off 
against future taxable income, reducing such income and accordingly saving tax on 
R280mil (R78,4mil). 
 
Illustration of - Scenario 4 
In this scenario, Company A incurs R120mil capital exploration expenditure.  
Company A then farms-out 50% of its participation in the South African exploration 
right to Company B for R160mil (R100mil initial cost plus 50% of exploration).  
 
Tax effect – on capital expenditure 
 
  Tax deduction of  R120mil (exploration capital expenditure) 
 Plus  Tax uplift of 100% R120mil 

















A. Tax effect on farm-out – Roll-over treatment 
  R160mil          - no tax as deemed to be sold for tax value 
 
Impact –  Company A receives R160mil tax- free 
 
Company B will not have a tax deduction for the funds that it paid for its participation 
in the South African exploration right. Furthermore Company B inherits its base cost 
from Company A for CGT purposes. Namely Company B will not receive a CGT 
benefit either for the funds that it paid.  
 
 
B. Tax effect – Participation treatment 
 
  R160mil     - treated as taxable income 
 
Impact – Company A will include the R160mil received in its taxable income. 
Therefore  Company A  will pay additional tax on R160mil (R44,8mil). 
 
Company B has a tax deduction for the R160mil that it paid for participation in the 
South African exploration right. Therefore Company B has a saving tax on the 
R160mil (R44,8mil) in the future, when it generates taxable income. 
 
Table 1: Summary of scenario results 
 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Company A 
shelters R240 mil 




A. Company A 
shelters R120mil 
from tax by 
spending Nil and 









B. Company A 
incurs tax on an 
additional 
A.  Company A 
receives a tax 
deduction on 
R240mil and 


















B. Company A 
shelters R20mil 







B. Company A 
receives a tax 
deduction on 
R240mil but 




Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
N/A A. Company B shelters 





B. Company B shelters 
R220mil from tax 




A. Company B shelters 





B. Company B shelters 




A. Company B 





B. Company B shelters 





Note that the author has assumed that Company B is a South African resident for tax purposes. If 
Company B is a foreign entity, the tax rate of 31% instead of 28% should be used. 
 
The scenario 4 is the most tax efficient for Company A, particularly when the 
subsequent farm-out is in conjunction with a roll over treatment election by the 
disposing company.  In  scenario 4 Company A obtained a tax deduction equal to 
200% of the exploration capital expenditure at, in effect, no cost to Company A. 
Whilst Company B receives no tax benefit for income tax nor CGT purposes. 
 
Where the participation treatment is elected by the disposing company, Company A 
obtains a tax deduction equal to 100% of the capital expenditure at in effect no cost to 

















Where Company A is in a tax paying position, scenario 4 with the roll over treatment 
is favoured by the disposing company. Where Company A is in an assessed loss 
position, it may consider scenario 4 with the participation treatment election as a 
possible issue for price negotiation. 
 
The scenario 3, favours Company B most when used in conjunction with the 
participation treatment election by the disposing company. Second to scenario 1 
(namely, no farm-out) this is the only scenario with a cost to Company A.  No farm-
out may still be out is favoured to scenario 3 because Company A’s interest is un-
dissolved and the company stands to benefit 100% from revenue when the mining 
block enters production.  
 
It should be noted that the Tenth Schedule is a schedule to the Income Tax Act and 
accordingly where the disposing company has failed to make an election 
(participation or rollover) that the taxation of the disposal of the oil and gas right 
reverts back to the “normal” provisions of the Income Tax Act
146
 (Refer to 4.5 of this 
dissertation).   
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Annexure I of the OP26 lease
147
 provides the following example of the application of 
the unredeemed capital expenditure allowance. 
 
First year of pre-production activities 
Actual capital expenditure qualifying for 
redemption 
Unredeemed balance of Capital 
Expenditure (C/E) for the purpose of 
calculating the Capital Allowance (C/A) 
 
Incurred during the year      R2 000 000 
C/A for the year                   R   120 000 
 
Carried Forward                   R2 120 000 
 
Incurred                                R2 000 000 
C/A for the year (at 12%      R    120 000 
pro rata for a portion of a year *) 
                                               R2 120 000 
 
 
Second year of pre-production activities 
Balance brought forward     R2 120 000 
Incurred during the year**   R2 000 000 
C/A for the year                    R    370 800 
Carried Forward                    R4 490 800 
Balance brought forward    R2 120 000 
Incurred during the year ** R1 940 000 
C/A for the year (at 12%)    R   370 800 
                                             R4 430 800 
*  C/E is calculated at 12% (or other applicable percentage) from the end of the month 
during which it was incurred until the end of the tax year. In this example, however, it 
is supposed that all the qualifying C/E was incurred just before the end of the 6
th
  
month of the tax year. 
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First year of production 
1) Calculation of taxable income: 
Gross income            R3 000 000 
Working costs           R3 740 000 
Working loss             R   740 000 
Redeemption of C/E  R6 626 896 
Assessed loss            R 7 366 896 
 
2) C/E qualifying for redemption: 
Unredeemed balance b/f R4 490 800 
Incurred during the year R1 500 000 
C/A for the year                R 636 096 
Total allowed for redemption  
                                        R6 626 896 
 
Thus no balance carried forward 
3) Calculation of C/A in determining the balance of 
C/E for the purposes of the C/A 
 
Unredeemed balance                                C/A at 12% 
Balance b/f                 R4 430 800              R531 696 
C/E incurred               R1 500 000               R 90 000 
Possible C/E included 
in working costs but on 
which C/A is allowed R   240 000               R 14 400 
C/A for the year          R   636 096   ►      R 636 096 
                                    R6 806 896             
 
Deduct 
C/E allowed for redemption: 
Amount deducted in the 
calculation of profits is  
R 6 626 896 but the deduction 
is restricted under section 26(3) 
to the amount of the “profit”, 
i.e.                                 R  NIL 
Unredeemed balance 


























Second year of production 
1) Calculation of taxable 
income: 
Gross income           R7 000 000 
Working costs          R3 500 000 
Working profit         R3 500 000 
 
Deduct: 
Redeemption of C/E R1 900 828 
Assessed loss b/f      R 7 366 896 
Assessed loss c/f      R 5 767 724 
 
2) C/E qualifying for redemption: 
Balance b/f                      NIL 
C/E incurred for the year R1000 000 
C/A for the year              R   900 828 
Total allowed for redemption  
                                        R1 900 828 
 
 
3) Calculation of C/A in determining the balance of 
C/E for the purposes of the C/A 
 
Unredeemed balance                                C/A at 12% 
Balance b/f                 R6 806 896              R816 828 
C/E incurred               R1 000 000               R 60 000 
Possible C/E included 
in working costs but on 
which C/A is allowed R   400 000               R 24 000 
C/A for the year          R   900 828   ►      R 900 828 
                                    R9 107 724             
 
Deduct: C/E allowed for 
Redemption as calculated  
below                          *R3 400 000 
Unredeemed balance 
carried forward            R 5 707 724      
 
*C/E allowed for redemption 
Deemed deduction (section 26(4)) is R9 107 724 but 
the deduction is restricted under section 26(3) to the 
amount of the “profit” i.e: 
Working profit                                            R3 500 000 
Plus: C/E included in working costs 
but which can for the purposes of the 
C/A be regarded as C/E                              R   400 000 
                                                                   R 3 900 000 
Deduct: So much of the loss brought 
forward which is not ascribable to the 
C/E (see below) #                                        R  500 000 
















# The portion of the loss brought forward not 
resulting from the deduction of C/E 
Assessed loss brought forward               R 7 366 896 
Actual C/E (redemption  
allowance)                    R6 626 896 
C/E in working costs     R   240 000      R 6 866 896 
                                                                R   500 000 
 
Third year of production 
4) Calculation of taxable income: 
Gross income               R8 000 000 
Working costs              R3 900 000 
Working profit            R 4 100 000 
C/E redemption            R1 214 927 
Assessed loss b/f          R 5 767 724 
Assessed loss c/f          R 2 882 651 
 
5) C/E qualifying for redemption: 
Unredeemed balance b/f            NIL 
C/E incurred for the year   R500 000 
C/A for the year                 R714 921 
                                        R1 214 927 
 
 
6) Calculation of C/A in determining the balance of 
C/E for the purposes of the C/A 
 
Unredeemed balance                                C/A at 12% 
Balance b/f                 R5 707 724              R684 927 
C/E incurred               R   500 000               R 30 000 
C/A for the year          R   714 927   ◄      R 714 927 
                                    R6 922 651             
 
Deduct: Redemption  
of C/E as calculated  
below                          **R4 100 000 
Balance c/f                     R 2 822 651       
 
*C/E allowed for redemption 
Deemed deduction (section 26(4)) is R6 922 651 but 
the deduction is restricted under section 26(3) to the 
amount of the “profit” i.e: 
Working profit                                         R4 100 000* 
Deduct: So much of the loss  
brought forward not resulting  
from the  C/E                                           R   NIL 
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